Adam Deen’s Misuse of the “Ḥanafī Māturīdī School”
Nov 8, 2015 9:59:18 GMT
StudentOfTheDeen and Abu Idris like this
Post by Zameel on Nov 8, 2015 9:59:18 GMT
Some would have, by now, seen Adam Deen’s piece on why he joined the Quilliam Foundation, a “think tank” aimed at targeting and silencing normative Muslim views. This post will answer some of his absurd claims, particularly the claim that his approach falls in line with traditional “Hanafi Maturidi” thought.
Adam Deen said:
In order to understand why Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent for his “rationalistic” approach in “Hanafi Maturidi” thought is misguided, it is necessary to appreciate the early theological debate over “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ).
The issue of “good” and “bad” according to the Māturīdīs and its rival theological schools, Ash‘arīs and Mu‘tazilīs, is often misunderstood. Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs are traditionalist Sunnī schools, while Mu‘tazilīs are a heterodox rationalist school.
The discussion of “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ) centres around three areas. On the first two, there is agreement amongst all three theological schools, and on the third, there is disagreement. “Goodness” and “badness” can be defined in three different ways:
1. Goodness in the sense of “perfection” and “completeness” and badness in the sense of “imperfection” and “incompleteness.” E.g. to have knowledge is a perfection, and hence “good” by this definition, while to be ignorant is an imperfection and hence “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.
2. Goodness in the sense of what agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and badness in the sense of what disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires. E.g. good health agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “good” by this definition, and bad health disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.
3. Goodness in the sense of what the Lawgiver, i.e. God, considers praiseworthy and deserving of reward, and badness in the sense of what the Lawgiver considers blameworthy and deserving of punishment. This is what Adam Deen refers to as “morally right and wrong.” The three theological schools differ on this last definition as follows:
a. The Māturīdīs say that everything that God orders via Sharī‘ah (scripture) is good and everything that God forbade via Sharī‘ah is bad, because God is All-Wise. But what He ordered is not good only because He ordered it. Rather, it was good before His command, and the order only made the goodness of it apparent. There are some things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. faith in One God, truthfulness, generosity, which we know to be good, not only because the Sharī‘ah ordered it, but because our mind also reveals their goodness to us. And there are other things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. praying five times a day and fasting in Ramaḍān, which we only know to be good because the Sharī‘ah orders it.
b. The Ash‘arīs agree with Māturīdīs on the fundamental point that everything the Sharī‘ah orders is good and everything it forbids is bad. They disagree, however, with Māturīdīs, on the moral absoluteness of the commands and prohibitions. They state that a command of Sharī‘ah is good only because the Sharī‘ah orders it. It was not “good” (in the sense being discussed) before the order of Sharī‘ah. Hence, it is conceivable that the Sharī‘ah would have ordered human beings to be untruthful and miserly, and in that case these traits would be “good”.
c. The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, disagree with both groups in principle. They state that there is no need for the Sharī‘ah to even reveal to us what is good and bad in certain areas. We know this rationally, independently of the Sharī‘ah.
This summary was extracted from Qamar al-Aqmār (Maktabat al-Bushrā, p. 125), a text on Ḥanafī (Māturīdī) juristic theory.
Hence, one will notice that there is a fundamental disagreement between the first two schools and the third.
Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs both agree on the primacy of the Sharī‘ah (scripture): the Ash‘arīs because the Sharī‘ah is the absolute moral standard, and the Māturīdīs because the Sharī‘ah reveals to us what is ontologically good and bad (or right and wrong), much of which we could not have understood without it. In neither school can reason, in matters of morality, override the letter of the law. In both schools, reason is secondary to scripture and subservient to it.
[The major practical disagreement that emerges from the disagreement between the Sunnī schools, Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs, on this issue is that of the fate of a person that the Sharī‘ah has not reached. Māturīdīs state that this person, by virtue of his intellect, is religiously accountable for believing in One God; Ash‘arīs state that this obligation does not occur until the Sharī‘ah reaches him.]
Hence, Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent in the Sunnī Māturīdī school for the view that reason unaided by scripture can discover what is morally right and wrong – and even override scripture – is certainly misguided.
The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, say reason and intellect are independent in grasping what is religiously good and bad in certain areas. Hence, unlike the Sunnī schools, they – at least theoretically – consider the Sharī‘ah in some respects secondary or, in extreme cases, redundant. The modernists who wish to give their reason (by which they really mean the prevailing “politically correct” narrative) primacy over revelation will find precedent amongst the early Mu‘tazila, at least in theory – although, in practice, they will find that they are very different to the Mu‘tazila, as the Mu‘tazila applied this principle primarily in issues of creed, while in matters of jurisprudence and law they did not generally disagree with the Sunnī schools.
Adam Deen says:
But, as the Sunnī schools said in response to the early Mu‘tazila who used a similar argument in certain issues: some of the very same “problems” you encounter in certain authentic hadiths, and consequently reject them, will be found in universally-accepted verses of the Qur’an. The Qur’an says a daughter’s inheritance is half of a son’s, the Qur’an allows slavery, the Qur’an says a thief’s hand should be cut, it prescribes corporal punishment for the fornicator and slanderer, etc. all of which would be deemed politically incorrect (and hence “irrational”) in today’s world.
Adam Deen says:
The Hadith has been transmitted to us in much the same way the Qur’an has been: through oral chains of transmission. Some hadiths do indeed share the same “epistemic position” as the Qur’an as they have been conveyed to us through numerous channels of transmission just like the Qur’an. These are referred to as “mutāwatir” hadiths.
Adam Deen said:
Firstly, this was not mentioned to ‘Ā’isha as a “narration.” Some people said in her presence that dogs, camels and women break the ṣalāh (when they walk in front), or it was mentioned to her that this is what some people are saying. ‘Ā’isha rejected this on the basis that the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) would pray while she would be lying down in front of him. (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī) Hence, she rejected it based on what she knew from the Sharī‘ah, not her own reason or so-called “feminist thinking.” Yes, she also decried the fact that they mentioned women and dogs as sharing the same ruling.
Most jurists in fact share the opinion of ‘Ā’isha: that nothing that walks in front of a person praying will break his prayer, although it may break his concentration.
Adam Deen said:
My convictions are very much in line with the Hanafi Maturidi school of thought. In particular, that human reason, unaided by scripture, can arrive at what is morally right and wrong.
In order to understand why Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent for his “rationalistic” approach in “Hanafi Maturidi” thought is misguided, it is necessary to appreciate the early theological debate over “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ).
The issue of “good” and “bad” according to the Māturīdīs and its rival theological schools, Ash‘arīs and Mu‘tazilīs, is often misunderstood. Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs are traditionalist Sunnī schools, while Mu‘tazilīs are a heterodox rationalist school.
The discussion of “good” (ḥasan) and “bad” (qabīḥ) centres around three areas. On the first two, there is agreement amongst all three theological schools, and on the third, there is disagreement. “Goodness” and “badness” can be defined in three different ways:
1. Goodness in the sense of “perfection” and “completeness” and badness in the sense of “imperfection” and “incompleteness.” E.g. to have knowledge is a perfection, and hence “good” by this definition, while to be ignorant is an imperfection and hence “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.
2. Goodness in the sense of what agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and badness in the sense of what disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires. E.g. good health agrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “good” by this definition, and bad health disagrees with peoples’ temperaments and desires and is therefore “bad” by this definition. All schools agree that this kind of “goodness” and “badness” can be comprehended by reason.
3. Goodness in the sense of what the Lawgiver, i.e. God, considers praiseworthy and deserving of reward, and badness in the sense of what the Lawgiver considers blameworthy and deserving of punishment. This is what Adam Deen refers to as “morally right and wrong.” The three theological schools differ on this last definition as follows:
a. The Māturīdīs say that everything that God orders via Sharī‘ah (scripture) is good and everything that God forbade via Sharī‘ah is bad, because God is All-Wise. But what He ordered is not good only because He ordered it. Rather, it was good before His command, and the order only made the goodness of it apparent. There are some things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. faith in One God, truthfulness, generosity, which we know to be good, not only because the Sharī‘ah ordered it, but because our mind also reveals their goodness to us. And there are other things which the Sharī‘ah orders, e.g. praying five times a day and fasting in Ramaḍān, which we only know to be good because the Sharī‘ah orders it.
b. The Ash‘arīs agree with Māturīdīs on the fundamental point that everything the Sharī‘ah orders is good and everything it forbids is bad. They disagree, however, with Māturīdīs, on the moral absoluteness of the commands and prohibitions. They state that a command of Sharī‘ah is good only because the Sharī‘ah orders it. It was not “good” (in the sense being discussed) before the order of Sharī‘ah. Hence, it is conceivable that the Sharī‘ah would have ordered human beings to be untruthful and miserly, and in that case these traits would be “good”.
c. The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, disagree with both groups in principle. They state that there is no need for the Sharī‘ah to even reveal to us what is good and bad in certain areas. We know this rationally, independently of the Sharī‘ah.
This summary was extracted from Qamar al-Aqmār (Maktabat al-Bushrā, p. 125), a text on Ḥanafī (Māturīdī) juristic theory.
Hence, one will notice that there is a fundamental disagreement between the first two schools and the third.
Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs both agree on the primacy of the Sharī‘ah (scripture): the Ash‘arīs because the Sharī‘ah is the absolute moral standard, and the Māturīdīs because the Sharī‘ah reveals to us what is ontologically good and bad (or right and wrong), much of which we could not have understood without it. In neither school can reason, in matters of morality, override the letter of the law. In both schools, reason is secondary to scripture and subservient to it.
[The major practical disagreement that emerges from the disagreement between the Sunnī schools, Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs, on this issue is that of the fate of a person that the Sharī‘ah has not reached. Māturīdīs state that this person, by virtue of his intellect, is religiously accountable for believing in One God; Ash‘arīs state that this obligation does not occur until the Sharī‘ah reaches him.]
Hence, Adam Deen’s claim of finding precedent in the Sunnī Māturīdī school for the view that reason unaided by scripture can discover what is morally right and wrong – and even override scripture – is certainly misguided.
The Mu‘tazila, on the other hand, say reason and intellect are independent in grasping what is religiously good and bad in certain areas. Hence, unlike the Sunnī schools, they – at least theoretically – consider the Sharī‘ah in some respects secondary or, in extreme cases, redundant. The modernists who wish to give their reason (by which they really mean the prevailing “politically correct” narrative) primacy over revelation will find precedent amongst the early Mu‘tazila, at least in theory – although, in practice, they will find that they are very different to the Mu‘tazila, as the Mu‘tazila applied this principle primarily in issues of creed, while in matters of jurisprudence and law they did not generally disagree with the Sunnī schools.
Adam Deen says:
Another way of expressing this is that our ethos should be more Qur’an focused rather than Hadith focused.
But, as the Sunnī schools said in response to the early Mu‘tazila who used a similar argument in certain issues: some of the very same “problems” you encounter in certain authentic hadiths, and consequently reject them, will be found in universally-accepted verses of the Qur’an. The Qur’an says a daughter’s inheritance is half of a son’s, the Qur’an allows slavery, the Qur’an says a thief’s hand should be cut, it prescribes corporal punishment for the fornicator and slanderer, etc. all of which would be deemed politically incorrect (and hence “irrational”) in today’s world.
Adam Deen says:
Over centuries the Hadith, to our detriment, has acquired the same epistemic position as the Quran.
The Hadith has been transmitted to us in much the same way the Qur’an has been: through oral chains of transmission. Some hadiths do indeed share the same “epistemic position” as the Qur’an as they have been conveyed to us through numerous channels of transmission just like the Qur’an. These are referred to as “mutāwatir” hadiths.
Adam Deen said:
Famously Aisha (may God be pleased with her) rejected a narration by a companion saying women like dogs broke the prayer, on the basis of comparing women to dogs, and this was well before any notion of feminist thinking influenced Hadith scholars!
Firstly, this was not mentioned to ‘Ā’isha as a “narration.” Some people said in her presence that dogs, camels and women break the ṣalāh (when they walk in front), or it was mentioned to her that this is what some people are saying. ‘Ā’isha rejected this on the basis that the Prophet (ṣallAllāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) would pray while she would be lying down in front of him. (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī) Hence, she rejected it based on what she knew from the Sharī‘ah, not her own reason or so-called “feminist thinking.” Yes, she also decried the fact that they mentioned women and dogs as sharing the same ruling.
Most jurists in fact share the opinion of ‘Ā’isha: that nothing that walks in front of a person praying will break his prayer, although it may break his concentration.