Post by tahawi on Oct 5, 2016 21:01:56 GMT
Paper Review: Jonathan A.C. Brown, The Rules of Matn Criticism: There Are No Rules, Islamic Law and Society 19 (2012) 356-396
The present essay will review Dr. Jonathan Brown’s paper “The Rules of Matn Criticism: There Are No Rules” by summarizing the author’s key arguments, analysing his methodology, and examining the merit of some of his claims. In contrast to common opinion in Western scholarship on Islam, the author accepts that early Hadīth scholars have engaged with the content of hadiths. In this paper, he takes the discussion a step further by ascertaining what governed the content criticism of Hadith scholars from the formative period of Sunni Hadith scholarship until the present day.
The main ideas of Brown’s paper can be summarized into four main points. First, he opens the discussion by highlighting the conflicting approaches to Hadith criticism by two camps: the “ahl al-hadīth/Sunni movement” and the Rationalists. The former would subordinate reason to the revealed text while the latter would analyse the revealed text through reason. He points out that the Ahl al-Hadīth scholars regarded flaws in the content of hadiths as the result of flaws in their transmission; their content criticism therefore was almost always phrased as transmission criticism. This is true for early Hadith scholars because in later Hadith scholarship content criticism received open recognition through the works of al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī (d. 463 AH) who developed a set of criteria for content criticism—imported from the Rationalist camp—that was upheld by Sunni scholars after him.
Second, he analyses the rules of matn criticism according to Sunnī Hadīth scholars. This forms the main subject of his paper. The underlying rule of matn criticism, he argues, was the experiential faculty that developed within a scholar after long exposure to hadiths; some have added an element of spirituality and God-consciousness as a factor. This means that a scholar of Hadith, after spending years involved with hadiths, develops a sense by which he would determine whether a report is actually the statement of the Prophet. This concept can be found in the writing of early scholars like Ibn ‘Adī (d. 365 AH) and latter-day scholars like Ibn Daqīq al-‘Id (d. 702 AH). As such, there were no hard and fast rules for matn criticism; rather, it was based on an experiential faculty. This theme is found in the title of the article “There Are No Rules.” Considering the subjectivity of reason, if people were to weigh the authenticity of hadiths on the scale of their reason, everyone would come to different conclusions. Hadīth scholars understood the problems with the subjectivity of human reason and therefore kept it at bay when grading hadiths.
Third, he studies two famous reports of the Prophet which appear to conflict with one another. The first is the ‘Hadīth of Cringing,’ which encourages Muslims to critically evaluate hadiths by their understanding, and the second is ‘the Hadīth of Charity,’ which encourages them to always find alternative interpretations. Brown studies the implicit usage of the two hadiths by Hadīth scholars. He studies the works of two prominent scholars: Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748 AH) whose works reflect the Hadīth of Cringing, i.e. he frequently engages in content criticism, and Mullā ‘Alī al-Qārī (d. 1014 AH), whose works reflect the Hadīth of Charity, i.e. he lends more charitable readings to the hadīths. By this, he demonstrates how there is inevitable subjectivity in content criticism. On the one hand, a Hadith scholar would regard a particular hadith as having an unacceptable meaning while another scholar would find no problem in its meaning.
Finally, he demonstrates how the tension among early Hadith scholars and the Rationalists in the formative and pre-modern periods of Islam manifests with new force from the 17th century onward. In the Modern era, the issue of content criticism reaches new heights, due to Modernity and exposure to European societies. In the Modern period, there are two camps: the likes of Rashīd Ridā (d. 1935 CE), who had no qualms in rejecting hadiths which were traditionally regarded as authentic (e.g. the prostration of the sun), and the likes of Yusuf al-Dijawī (d. 1946 AH) who vehemently opposed what he regarded as unwarranted interference of human reason in scripture. Brown notes how the debates in the Modern context are in fact nothing new because similar debates ensued in pre-Modern scholarly circles.
These four points summarize Brown’s paper. There are two areas in his article that need to be critically assessed. The first is the author’s methodology and the second is the merit of the main argument of his study.
From the outset, Brown outlines his methodology by stating that he intends to examine how the “ahl al-hadīth/Sunni movement” engaged in content criticism. However, to consider the Ahl al-Hadīth synonymous to the Sunni movement is debatable. Such a designation of the term “Sunni” excludes the likes of Abū Hanīfah who although were more known for their juristic inclination, were nonetheless part of the Sunni movement. This is clearly documented in one of the most authoritative early Sunni works of creed, al-‘Aqīdah al-Tahāwiyyah. Abu Ja‘far al-Tahāwī (d. 321 AH) prefaces the treatise by writing, “The following is an exposition of the beliefs of the Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamā‘ah in accordance to the position of the jurists of Islām: Abū Hanīfah al-Nu‘mān ibn Thābit al-Kūfī…” In fact, Abū Hanīfah himself in his magnum opus “al-Fiqh al-Akbar” delegates the term Ahl al-Sunnah to refer to the orthodox view. If Brown were to expand his definition of “Sunni” he would have had more scholars to work on as case studies and would definitely come out with a different conclusion. This is more so when early Hanafīs were known to be more critical in their acceptance of hadiths in view of their content as they took a position between that of the Ahl al-Hadīth and the Rationalists. However, Brown’s main focus seems to be the Ahl al-Hadīth and not the Sunni movement, and therefore, even if he took a broader definition of the latter he would still restrict his discussion by examining the former.
Brown illustrates the practical dimension of the Hadīth of Cringing and the Hadīth of Charity by studying two latter-day Hadith scholars, al-Dhahabī and al-Qārī. An example of such subjectivity among early Hadith scholars can be found in the discussion on the hadith that prohibits believers from voluntary fasting once half the month of Sha‘ban passes. ‘Abd al-Rahmān ibn Mahdī (d. 198 AH) refused to narrate this hadith as he felt that it contradicted a sounder report which stated that the Prophet himself would fast during that time, while Abū Dāwūd (d. 275 AH) and his teacher Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241 AH) opined that there exists no incongruity between the two reports. The case of Ibn Mahdī exemplifies the Hadīth of Cringing while the case of Abū Dāwūd exemplifies the Hadīth of Charity.
Regarding the core argument of the paper, i.e. the idea that ‘there are no rules of matn criticism,’ it is correct that the scholars of Hadīth lacked concrete rules that governed their matn criticism. As Ibn Rajab al-Hanbalī (d. 795 AH) aptly notes, “They have a specific method of evaluating each hadith; they lack a universal principle that governs this.” But neither was it arbitrary criticism because the experiential faculty mentioned above developed within them certain rules to work with, which they perhaps were unable to articulate. A similar phenomenon is at play when al-Shāfi‘ī (d. 204 AH) says, “I recognize the difference in this issue, but I am unable to articulate it” or where Abū Yūsuf (d. 182 AH) says, “I recognize the difference between the two issues but cannot articulate it.” Furthermore, although Brown justly points out that early Hadith critics would always justify their content criticism by identifying a problem in the chain of transmission, it is imperative to keep in mind the underlying reason for such a justification. When it said that a hadith has problematic content, there are two possible meanings: either it means that the Prophet made a statement that is problematic, or it means that someone in the chain made an error which led to the problematic content. When Hadith scholars found the content of a hadith problematic, they would have to point out a flaw in the chain of transmission. This is because they did not regard the Prophet to have made such a statement, and therefore, they would identify the cause for the discrepancy in the content. Ibn al-Salāh (d. 643 AH) explains, “When the content [of a hadith] is inauthentic, it is impossible for it to have an authentic chain” i.e. there is a definite flaw in the chain which needs to identified. This explanation helps to understand why their content criticism is always tied to criticism of the chain.
Prior to Brown’s study, Hātim al-‘Awnī had already drawn attention to the Rationalist influence on Hadīth studies from the fifth century AH where he argued that the transfer of terminologies and methodology from the Rationalist camp, which came in via the legal theorists, eventually led to the decline of classical Hadīth scholarship. Ibn Rajab al-Hanbalī in fact draws attention—with a hint of displeasure—to the transfer of terminology from the Rationalists via the legal theorists with particular reference to al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī. Brown’s article, on the other hand, demonstrates that at least in terms of content criticism Rationalist concepts in fact helped Hadīth scholars construct clear criteria which later formed the bases of accepted content criticism in Sunni Hadīth scholarship. Ironically, the pioneer in formulating these criteria among the Hadīth scholars, al-Khatīb al-Baghdādī, himself never employed these criteria in any of his extant works though later scholar have done so. This shows that harmonizing Rationalist idea within a Hadīth framework began as a theoretical enterprise and then later Hadīth scholars employed them when the tensions between the two camps, the Hadīth scholars and the Rationalists, settled.
Brown writes that the contemporary Hadīth scholar Khalīl Mulla Khatir introduced the methodological distinction between what is unlikely (yastaghribūn) and what is impossible (mustahīl) in respect to the content of hadīths. The former is relative to one’s understanding and will yield varying results; something can be unlikely to one person while the same thing is regarded as likely by another. The latter is inherent to a thing itself; a circle can never take the shape of a square. This distinction, however, was already noted by scholars before Mulla Khātir, such as Mustafa al-Sibā‘ī (d. 1964 CE). Saying that it was Mulla Khātir who introduced this concept gives the reader the impression that this distinction was not employed by earlier Hadīth scholars and only found its way into modern Hadīth discourse late. Furthermore, other contemporary Hadith scholars have re-examined al-Khatīb’s criteria on matn criticism, particularly the criterion that features most prominently, that is, conflict with reason. ‘Abd Allah al-Ghumārī (d. 1993 CE) writes that ‘conflict with reason’ refers to logical fallacies: one is half of two; it cannot be otherwise. If this explanation of al-Khatīb’s criterion is accepted, it can be argued that this distinction can actually be traced back as early as the fifth century.
In conclusion, Brown presents a thorough study by examining both primary and secondary sources to identify the underlying factor that determined the decisions of early Hadith scholars vis-à-vis content criticism, i.e. an experiential faculty; hence, there are no rules per se. This explains the apparent conflict in the usage of matn criticism by Hadith scholars, as experience and reason are subjective. From the formative period to the reappearance of such debates in the Modern period, this study demonstrates how history often repeats itself. This study can help contemporary Hadith scholars to appreciate the tension among early Muslim scholars in respect to the various approaches to Hadith criticism and to use that as a way to navigate through similar tensions that have resurfaced in the present day.
References
Brown, “The Rules of Matn Criticism: There Are No Rules,” pp.358-364
Ibid., pp.364-366
Ibid., pp.385-395
Ibid., p.358
Al-Tahāwī, Abū Ja‘far, (2002) al-‘Aqīdah al-Tahāwiyyah, p.1
Abū Hanīfah, al-Nu‘mān (1999), al-Fiqh al-Akbar, Maktabat al-Furqān, p.159. On the authorship of al-Fiqh al-Akbar, see: Mangera, Abdur-Rahman (2007), Imam Abū Hanīfah’s al-Fiqh al-Akbar Explained, London: White Thread Press, pp.24-29
Abū Dāwūd, Sulaymān (2009), al-Sunan, Beirut: Dār al-Risālah, no.2337
Ibid., vol.4, p.26
Ibn Rajab, Sharh ‘Ilal al-Tirmidhī, vol.1, p.353. Commenting on Ibn Rajab’s observation, Mujīr al-Khatīb clarifies, “Meaning thereby that they lacked a comprehensive principle that applies to all hadiths, although they had a detailed principle which is indicated by signs.”
Al-Rāzī, Ibn Abī Hātim, (1997) Manāqib al-Shāfi‘ī, p.84
Al-Muwaffaq, al-Makkī (1903) Manāqib al-Imām, p.493
Ibn al-Salāh, Abū ‘Amr (1407), Fatāwā Ibn al-Salāh, Beirut: Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam, p.45
See al-‘Awnī’s book “al-Manhaj al-Muqtarah li Fahm al-Mustalah”
Ibn Rajab, Zayn al-Dīn (1987), Sharh ‘Ilal al-Tirmidhī, Jordan: Maktabat al-Manār, vol.1, .428
Al-Sibā’ī, Mustafa (1982), Al-Sunnah wa Makānatuhā fi al-Tashrī’ al-Islāmī, Damascus: al-Maktab al-Islāmī, pp.51-52
Al-Ghumārī, ‘Abd Allah (1980), al-Qawl al-Jazl fī mā lā Yu‘dhar fīhī bi al-Jahl, Beirut: Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa al-Hikam p.11