Post by Abu Zaid on Aug 25, 2017 14:33:21 GMT
Here is a Book review of "On Taqlīd: Ibn al Qayyim’s Critique of Authority in Islamic Law" by Abdul-Rahman Mustafa, New York, Oxford University Press, 2013, 256 pp.
Amazon link
My intention of posting this review on here is to draw the attention of the 'Ulama over this Book.
-----------------
The progress of any legal system can be directly correlated to the freedom that its jurists enjoy to exercise independent reasoning. Because of this ijtihād and taqlīd in Islamic Law have taken the lion's share of Western academic discussion. Ijtihād, a jurist’s independent interpretation of law, was to be the hallmark of the Islamic legal system. Taqlīd on the other hand was criticized for limiting the law and its applicability.
Taqlīd, translated by Mustafa as “imitation,” operationalizes legal precedent by obliging those unable to interpret the law to "imitate" the decisions of the scholars before him. This created a hierarchy of legal interpretation and a level of standardization of how the law is applied. Muftis, qāḍis, and other scholars transitioned from engaging with the sources of Islamic thought directly to engaging solely with the opinions and standard texts of their respective schools. It is here that the criticism of Taqlīd is most relevant and which Ibn alQayyim laments the most in this work.
“On Taqlīd” is a work in three parts. The first is an introduction to Taqlīd and Ibn alQayyim's positions on the topic. Part two is entitled “An exposition on Imitation” and lays out Ibn Al-Qayyim’s arguments against imitation. Part three consists of a dialogue between Ibn al-Qayyim and an unidentified interlocutor promoting a pro-Taqlīd stance. Was Ibn alQayyim merely collating arguments made by numerous proponents of Taqlīd, or was he answering one specific person or group of persons famous for these arguments? As has been shown in new research of earlier works such as al-Shāfiʿī’s Risālah, these interlocutors do at times have actual historic basis.
In the introduction, the author succeeds in showing the depth needed on this topic. He weaves the arguments used by Ibn al-Qayyim mentioned in the second and third parts into a narrative that spans the length of Islamic history from the modern period, reaching back to the period of the great Imams like Al-Shafiʿī. Mustafa first frames the discussion of Taqlīd in the modern debates of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadis scholars of South Asia, showing the applicability of these arguments even today. He then presents the topic’s main arguments through the opinions of select scholarly figures throughout Islamic history. Pro and AntiTaqlīd opinions are surveyed, interspersed with connections back to Ibn al-Qayyim’s work “A Note to Those Who Sign in the Name of the Lord of the Worlds” [Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīnʿan Rabb ʾl-ʿAlamīn] from which the translated chapters of “On Taqlīd” are drawn from. The incoherence and at times inanity of Pro-Taqlīd positions is exemplified well, with the bulk of examples coming from pro-Taqlīd Hanafi jurisprudents. While this coverage does gives readers a glance at the breadth of this topic and its reach, for the uninitiated this may be a confusing tour through random opinions expressed throughout Islamic history.
The introduction ends with Mustafa summarizing Ibn al-Qayyim’s tripartite system for contextualizing the use of Taqlīd. This system sets the boundaries for its use, and when crossed would exhibit the type of Taqlīd that is inexcusable in Ibn al-Qayyim’s opinion. First of these is the supremacy and sufficiency of scripture for solving legal and theological problems. To exemplify problems that arise when this boundary is crossed, Mustafa draws on the opinions of two epistemologically opposite camps: The Ahl al Raʾy, who uphold intellect as the referee of acceptable scripture, and the Ahl al-Ẓāhir who uphold scripture as the embodiment of all necessary answers. These two approaches had polarizing effects. The latter left the public with an impression of a restrictive faith unable to engage with the world around them. The former with a faith devoid of scriptural illumination and entrenched in the opinions of men, to the point that those opinions gained ascendancy to the Quran and Sunnah themselves. The second principle of this system draws directly on the assumptions of the parties rebuked in the first. The Ahl al-Raʾy and the Ahl al-Ẓāhir limited the applicability of scripture in different ways, but both for primarily the same reason: the assumption that there is an inherent contradiction between scripture and human reason. The second principle then is that revelation and reason are never contradictory, a principle championed by Ibn Taymiyah in his voluminous work “A Defense Against the Contradiction of Reason and Revelation" [Darʾ Taʿārud al-ʿAql waʾl-Naql]. To make Ibn Al-Qayyim stand out on his own as a legal theorist, the seasoned reader would expect a reference to those before Ibn Taymiyah but this is not the case.
The third principle is the primacy of the opinions of the Salaf. Through this principle Ibn alQayyim reiterates the boundaries for the use of reason which does not contradict revelation. Taqlīd is an elastic term meaning different things to different people. When using it, ProTaqlīdscholars advocate for a mimetic normative tradition of Islamic thought, one predicated on uniformity and unbroken continuity. Anti-Taqlīd scholars advocate for an open ended, primary access to and application of the sacred texts of Islam. Ibn Al-Qayyim argues for a middle ground wherein the Mufti attempts to reach a conclusion on par with, or surpassing that of, those that preceded him. Here Mustafa aligns Ibn al-Qayyim with other legal heavy weights such as Shihāb al-Din al-Qarāfi (died. 1285) and Muhammad b. Idris al-Shāfiʿī (died. 820), showing that they advocated for a systematized analysis of scripture, one in which life was not limited by scriptural historicism (ala ahl al-Ẓāhir) nor was is secondary to or viewed as equal with the very fallible faculty of human reason (ala Ahl al-Raʾy). Ibn al-Qayyim frames this distinction as the difference between Taqlīd (imitation) and Ittibāʾ (following), but then continues to use the term Taqlīd interchangeably with concepts that border on Ittibāʾ. It is however apparent that while Mustafa places Ibn al-Qayyim in the center of the fray, he later shows him leaning heavily to the right of the center, if to the right is in direction Anti-Taqlīd advocates.
The summary of arguments found in the introduction succinctly creates a backdrop for reading Mustafa’s translation. This translation relies on Mashhūr Ḥasan Salmān’s critical edition and annotation of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn.[1] While Mustafa does leave out parts of the original work that pertain to Taqlīd, they are for the most part superfluous to the arguments presented in the translated sections and are for the most part anecdotal. The translation is adept and accurate.
Missing in this work is a clear delineation of Ibn al-Qayyim’s arguments as they apply to the legal hierarchies of the Mamluk era Islamic world in which he lived. With Taqlīd spanning a number of disciplines and official positions, there must be a difference between its use by acolytes in religious institutions, judges presiding over lower courts, and Muftis dealing with questions pertaining to everyday life. All of these have different circumstances and would necessitate different responses to the same question posed. While Ibn al-Qayyim does take the time to differentiate between imitation and following another in prayer, and imitation and narration of ḥadīth, he himself does not deal with this compartmentalization of the topic as would be apparent in the civil and religious institutions around him, nor does Mustafa touch on this oversight or explore the reasons why Ibn al-Qayyim would want to emphasis fatwa over all else.
This volume is a much needed addition to the body of work on Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn alQayyim, Mamluk era Islamic law, Hanbalism, and Islamic studies. The translator’s laudable effort will hopefully be the catalyst needed to encourage further study of these often neglected areas in the intellectual history of Islam and the Middle East.
Joe Bradford
Prairie View A&M University
Texas USA
__________________
[1] - Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya. 2002. Iʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn ʿan Rabb ʾl-ʿālamīn, Edited and
annotated by Mashhūr Hasan Salmān. Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzi.
Source
Amazon link
My intention of posting this review on here is to draw the attention of the 'Ulama over this Book.
-----------------
“But if there was a boat around I couldn’t see it, for stars and shadows ain’t good to see
by
…”
says Huck Finn. If ever there were a personality that this could apply to it would be Muḥammad b. Abu Bakr al-Zuraʿī (d. 1328), better known as Ibn al-Qayyim. A Ḥanbali theologian, jurist and legal theorist from Damascus, he was popular for his spiritual slant, yet much of his other work have long has been viewed only in light of his teacher Ibn Taymiyah’s works and thought.More than a parrot for his teacher’s opinions Ibn al-Qayyim was a masterful author in his own right and his corpus of work is testament to this. “On Taqlīd” produces a faithful rendition of Ibn al-Qayyim's treatment coupled with a deft introduction to this topic. Citing the lack of any substantial coverage of Ibn al-Qayyim's works in any Western language, along with the ubiquity of his works in the Islamic world, Mustafa’s main catalyst in the production of this volume is to present Ibn al-Qayyim as the influential legal jurist and theologian he is in his own right.
The progress of any legal system can be directly correlated to the freedom that its jurists enjoy to exercise independent reasoning. Because of this ijtihād and taqlīd in Islamic Law have taken the lion's share of Western academic discussion. Ijtihād, a jurist’s independent interpretation of law, was to be the hallmark of the Islamic legal system. Taqlīd on the other hand was criticized for limiting the law and its applicability.
Taqlīd, translated by Mustafa as “imitation,” operationalizes legal precedent by obliging those unable to interpret the law to "imitate" the decisions of the scholars before him. This created a hierarchy of legal interpretation and a level of standardization of how the law is applied. Muftis, qāḍis, and other scholars transitioned from engaging with the sources of Islamic thought directly to engaging solely with the opinions and standard texts of their respective schools. It is here that the criticism of Taqlīd is most relevant and which Ibn alQayyim laments the most in this work.
“On Taqlīd” is a work in three parts. The first is an introduction to Taqlīd and Ibn alQayyim's positions on the topic. Part two is entitled “An exposition on Imitation” and lays out Ibn Al-Qayyim’s arguments against imitation. Part three consists of a dialogue between Ibn al-Qayyim and an unidentified interlocutor promoting a pro-Taqlīd stance. Was Ibn alQayyim merely collating arguments made by numerous proponents of Taqlīd, or was he answering one specific person or group of persons famous for these arguments? As has been shown in new research of earlier works such as al-Shāfiʿī’s Risālah, these interlocutors do at times have actual historic basis.
In the introduction, the author succeeds in showing the depth needed on this topic. He weaves the arguments used by Ibn al-Qayyim mentioned in the second and third parts into a narrative that spans the length of Islamic history from the modern period, reaching back to the period of the great Imams like Al-Shafiʿī. Mustafa first frames the discussion of Taqlīd in the modern debates of Deobandi and Ahl-e-Hadis scholars of South Asia, showing the applicability of these arguments even today. He then presents the topic’s main arguments through the opinions of select scholarly figures throughout Islamic history. Pro and AntiTaqlīd opinions are surveyed, interspersed with connections back to Ibn al-Qayyim’s work “A Note to Those Who Sign in the Name of the Lord of the Worlds” [Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīnʿan Rabb ʾl-ʿAlamīn] from which the translated chapters of “On Taqlīd” are drawn from. The incoherence and at times inanity of Pro-Taqlīd positions is exemplified well, with the bulk of examples coming from pro-Taqlīd Hanafi jurisprudents. While this coverage does gives readers a glance at the breadth of this topic and its reach, for the uninitiated this may be a confusing tour through random opinions expressed throughout Islamic history.
The introduction ends with Mustafa summarizing Ibn al-Qayyim’s tripartite system for contextualizing the use of Taqlīd. This system sets the boundaries for its use, and when crossed would exhibit the type of Taqlīd that is inexcusable in Ibn al-Qayyim’s opinion. First of these is the supremacy and sufficiency of scripture for solving legal and theological problems. To exemplify problems that arise when this boundary is crossed, Mustafa draws on the opinions of two epistemologically opposite camps: The Ahl al Raʾy, who uphold intellect as the referee of acceptable scripture, and the Ahl al-Ẓāhir who uphold scripture as the embodiment of all necessary answers. These two approaches had polarizing effects. The latter left the public with an impression of a restrictive faith unable to engage with the world around them. The former with a faith devoid of scriptural illumination and entrenched in the opinions of men, to the point that those opinions gained ascendancy to the Quran and Sunnah themselves. The second principle of this system draws directly on the assumptions of the parties rebuked in the first. The Ahl al-Raʾy and the Ahl al-Ẓāhir limited the applicability of scripture in different ways, but both for primarily the same reason: the assumption that there is an inherent contradiction between scripture and human reason. The second principle then is that revelation and reason are never contradictory, a principle championed by Ibn Taymiyah in his voluminous work “A Defense Against the Contradiction of Reason and Revelation" [Darʾ Taʿārud al-ʿAql waʾl-Naql]. To make Ibn Al-Qayyim stand out on his own as a legal theorist, the seasoned reader would expect a reference to those before Ibn Taymiyah but this is not the case.
The third principle is the primacy of the opinions of the Salaf. Through this principle Ibn alQayyim reiterates the boundaries for the use of reason which does not contradict revelation. Taqlīd is an elastic term meaning different things to different people. When using it, ProTaqlīdscholars advocate for a mimetic normative tradition of Islamic thought, one predicated on uniformity and unbroken continuity. Anti-Taqlīd scholars advocate for an open ended, primary access to and application of the sacred texts of Islam. Ibn Al-Qayyim argues for a middle ground wherein the Mufti attempts to reach a conclusion on par with, or surpassing that of, those that preceded him. Here Mustafa aligns Ibn al-Qayyim with other legal heavy weights such as Shihāb al-Din al-Qarāfi (died. 1285) and Muhammad b. Idris al-Shāfiʿī (died. 820), showing that they advocated for a systematized analysis of scripture, one in which life was not limited by scriptural historicism (ala ahl al-Ẓāhir) nor was is secondary to or viewed as equal with the very fallible faculty of human reason (ala Ahl al-Raʾy). Ibn al-Qayyim frames this distinction as the difference between Taqlīd (imitation) and Ittibāʾ (following), but then continues to use the term Taqlīd interchangeably with concepts that border on Ittibāʾ. It is however apparent that while Mustafa places Ibn al-Qayyim in the center of the fray, he later shows him leaning heavily to the right of the center, if to the right is in direction Anti-Taqlīd advocates.
The summary of arguments found in the introduction succinctly creates a backdrop for reading Mustafa’s translation. This translation relies on Mashhūr Ḥasan Salmān’s critical edition and annotation of Ibn al-Qayyim’s Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn.[1] While Mustafa does leave out parts of the original work that pertain to Taqlīd, they are for the most part superfluous to the arguments presented in the translated sections and are for the most part anecdotal. The translation is adept and accurate.
Missing in this work is a clear delineation of Ibn al-Qayyim’s arguments as they apply to the legal hierarchies of the Mamluk era Islamic world in which he lived. With Taqlīd spanning a number of disciplines and official positions, there must be a difference between its use by acolytes in religious institutions, judges presiding over lower courts, and Muftis dealing with questions pertaining to everyday life. All of these have different circumstances and would necessitate different responses to the same question posed. While Ibn al-Qayyim does take the time to differentiate between imitation and following another in prayer, and imitation and narration of ḥadīth, he himself does not deal with this compartmentalization of the topic as would be apparent in the civil and religious institutions around him, nor does Mustafa touch on this oversight or explore the reasons why Ibn al-Qayyim would want to emphasis fatwa over all else.
This volume is a much needed addition to the body of work on Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn alQayyim, Mamluk era Islamic law, Hanbalism, and Islamic studies. The translator’s laudable effort will hopefully be the catalyst needed to encourage further study of these often neglected areas in the intellectual history of Islam and the Middle East.
Joe Bradford
Prairie View A&M University
Texas USA
__________________
[1] - Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya. 2002. Iʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn ʿan Rabb ʾl-ʿālamīn, Edited and
annotated by Mashhūr Hasan Salmān. Riyadh: Dār Ibn al-Jawzi.
Source
