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Introduction

National Zakat Foundation (NZF), which describes itself as “UK’s only Zakāt institution”, has recently released a relatively lengthy document outlining the juristic positions it adopts on basic Zakāt-related matters with an explanation of how these positions were reached.[1] The document rightly cautions that “Zakat is a pillar of Islam and any misconduct or complacency will surely face accountability in the court of Allah.”[2] It will become evident from the following discussion, however, that it falls very short of this standard. Despite being authored by one of its “in-house” Ḥanafī muftīs, the overall tenor of the piece is very antithetical to the legal philosophy of the Ḥanafī madhhab on Zakāt.[3] It explicitly favours a juristic methodology that can only be described as “modernist”. A highly skewed presentation of the concept of Zakāt is offered, together with a dangerous and chaotic Fiqh methodology. Moreover, classical positions are sometimes misrepresented to suit the narrative that is being pushed.

In the following review (which is not intended to be exhaustive), the methodology, positions and arguments put forward in the NZF document will be critiqued. The aim is for readers to be made aware of its methodological flaws and misrepresentation of classical positions, and to also reach a more balanced and sound understanding on the nature of Zakāt and the issues raised.

Fiqh Methodology

Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ (577 – 643 H) relates a consensus of the scholars that when there are multiple conflicting views on an issue of Fiqh one cannot simply adopt any view he or she likes but must act on the preponderant view.[4] A mujtahid, or a scholar capable of assessing the scriptural evidence, will assess the preponderant view based on an objective examination of the textual evidence, while a non-mujtahid will do so by following the mujtahid he is most inclined to. If one adopts a position merely based on the knowledge that the position exists, and not based on either one of these two methods, Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī (683 – 756 H) explains that he will be sinful.[5]

Moreover, if a non-mujtahid adopts a position outside of the legal school (madhhab) of the mujtahid he normally follows, that will amount to following his desires and will thus not be permissible. Imām al-Ghazālī (450 – 505 H) explains: “It is not permissible for the follower of a mujtahid to choose the most pleasing of [variant] opinions to him and the most agreeable to his temperament. He must follow his imām, who he believes to have the correct and right madhhab in relation to others, and follow him in all that comes and goes. Hence, it is not permissible for a Mālikī to switch to the madhhab of al-Shāfi‘ī unless he has an overwhelming feeling that its opinions are more correct. In that case, it is necessary to follow him in all juristic rulings. Otherwise, there is no motive for him to oppose [his madhhab] besides base desire, just as it is not permissible for a mujtahid to oppose the conclusions that his ijtihād (juristic judgement) reached.”[6] Imām al-Ghazālī and his contemporary, Qāḍī ‘Iyāḍ (476 – 544 H), relate consensus on this.[7]

The NZF document articulates its Fiqh methodology as follows: “So how does an organisation adopt an opinion and keep within a framework, avoiding the random selection of opinions and policies? A critical part of the answer is to have a clear vision that reflects the overarching purpose of Zakat and then ensuring that policy decisions remain as consistent as possible with the overall goal. At NZF, we have a vision for Islam to flourish in society as a source of prosperity and harmony for all. Our mission is to distribute Zakat transformatively within the United Kingdom, in order to help achieve our vision. It is in this transparently stated backdrop that we then consider the following, in consultation with our Advisers: 1. Classical positions of the four schools of Islamic law. 2. The Fatawa of Darul Iftaas or resolutions of global bodies.”

In other words, their methodology is to pick and choose from all available opinions, both classical and modern, those that reflect what they consider to be “the overarching purpose of Zakāt”. As will be shown below (in the section on “Broadening the Purposes of Zakāt”), the views they draw from to support their stated “overarching purpose of Zakāt” are themselves points of disagreement. Thus, there are disagreements on the “overall purpose of Zakāt”, and the NZF document does not explain why it picked one opinion on this matter over the other. Instead, it mentions that they have a “vision”, and choose opinions based on this stated vision. This is precisely what “following desires” is. Even a person who selects opinions based on his desires is not doing so “randomly”. He is nonrandomly selecting those opinions that suit his purpose. Thus, NZF is explicitly advocating an agenda-driven Fiqh, where the purpose of Fiqh is not to follow the preponderant opinion, but to follow any view from the multiplicity of conflicting opinions that exist when it agrees with their agenda. This is the very thing that the scholars of the past had cautioned against.

NZF could of course retort that their “agenda” is in this case not for self-interest or for the gain of the members of the organisation but for what they view to be the stated outcomes or benefits (maṣāliḥ) of Zakāt. This highly subjective maṣāliḥ-based approach will be briefly critiqued in the next section, together with an explanation of why self-interests are not ruled out even when adopting this approach.

The document further uses the fact that it operates as an “organisation” to claim that the possibility of adopting views out of self-interest is effectively ruled out. It states: “Many scholars have written in reference to following one school of Islamic law for all of one’s practices at an individual level. However, an organisation is different to an individual person. The issues of following one’s nafs (whims) and insincerely searching for easiest opinions are far less possible or relevant. A charity organisation is regulated by the Charity Commission, has the oversight of a board of Trustees, there is transparency and accountability to the public, as well as clearly stated organisational objectives and policies.”[8]

This is flawed logic. Just because an organisation or body acts with transparency, it does not mean that the positions it adopts are not based on self-interest. Political parties are an example of organisations which we know at times to formulate policies based on corrupt self-interests rather than genuine moral interests. It is absurd to claim that an organisation is immune from such unscrupulous selection of opinions.

It would be equivalent to an individual who picks views to suit his desires but then claims: “I can’t be following my desires because I follow these opinions openly and I can show everyone that I follow them meticulously!” Transparency in operations does not rule out the possibility that opinions were chosen based on desire or self-interests.

Trying to bolster this modernist agenda-driven pick-and-choose Fiqh methodology, the document quotes two recent Deobandī scholars, Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī al-Thānawī and Shaykh al-Hind Mawlānā Maḥmūd al-Ḥasan. It quotes the first scholar as follows: “Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanawi writes that Taqleed Shakhsi in itself is neither Fardh nor Wajib. However, Taqleed Shakhsi brings organisation (Intizam) to one’s Deen. (Usul al-Iftaa p.73 Maktabah Ma’ariful Qur’an)”[9]

Note: The sentence quoted from Mawlānā Thānawī is incomplete; the complete sentence adds that there is “anarchy in leaving” taqlīd shakhṣī (following a single madhhab).[10]

It quotes the second scholar as follows: “Shaykh al-Hind Maulana Mahmudul Hasan states that following a particular Madhab is not a Shar’i ruling but a Fatwa for organisation/systemisation of issues relating to Deen. (Usul al-Iftaa p.72 Maktabah Ma’ariful Qur’an)”[11]

Both Mawlānā Thānawī and Shaykh al-Hind believed in the obligation of adhering to a single madhab as a default. They are both signatories of the well-known Deobandī apologetic tract, al-Muhannad ‘ala l-Mufannad, that states: “There is no option for a person in this period but to follow one of the four imāms, and in fact this is obligatory…This is why we and our teachers are followers of the imām of the Muslims, Abū Ḥanīfah, in both foundations and peripherals.”[12]

In the statements quoted from them in the NZF document, they are making the point that the obligation of adhering to a single madhhab is not something intrinsic to Sharī‘ah but is based on circumstances that arose after the early era. In another work, Mawlānā Thānawī makes it clear that only in extenuating circumstances of genuine need (ḍarūrah)[13] can one move outside his madhhab.[14] Similarly, Shaykh al-Hind Mawlānā Maḥmūd Ḥasan al-Deobandī writes in another work: “In rulings of Fiqh, it is necessary to differentiate between the stronger and weaker views, the muftā bihī (the fatwā position) and the non-muftā bihī. There is no licence for any learned or unlearned person to act on a transmission that accords with his wishes.”[15] It would be disingenuous therefore to quote these scholars who believe in the obligation of adhering to a single madhhab as a default rule for support of the Fiqh methodology that NZF espouses.

For more on the necessity of classical madhhab-based jurisprudence, one can read the links provided in the footnote.[16]

Another point to note is that the NZF document relies heavily on personal opinions of contemporary or very recent scholars. Based on the correct methodology of classical madhhab-based Fiqh, the function of recent and contemporary jurists is to transmit and accurately present the madhhab’s position (along with surrounding discussions where necessary) and apply it correctly to circumstances that arise. If they are acting outside of this capacity, bringing in their personal judgements on proof texts and extrapolating beyond what the madhhab dictates, their views do not hold any merit. We come at a time in history after the Ummah has been plagued with (cultural) colonisation, modernisation and westernisation and the general corruption of Islāmic thought, so it is all the more necessary to be wary of personal opinions of individual scholars.

A Maṣāliḥ-Based Approach?

The NZF document makes it clear that they adopt a vision based on what they see is the “overarching purpose of Zakāt” and how they feel Zakāt can be used “transformatively” in the UK, and select opinions based on that vision. At best, this can be characterised as a subjective maṣāliḥ-based approach to Fiqh. Thus, for example, while justifying its adoption of a view that is ostensibly at odds with classical consensus (see section on “In the Cause of Allāh” below), the document states: “The entire objective behind adopting this opinion is to facilitate growth and scalability of causes serving Islam and Muslims in the UK which fall under this category. It is to enhance and finance initiatives which can have strategic benefit for Islam and Muslims in the UK. The entire activity in finding the underpinning Fiqh of a category is then supported by the views of many contemporary Ulama which serves the Maslahah (interests) of Islam and Muslims in the UK.”[17]

The repercussions of adopting such an approach are disastrous. Someone can just as easily contend that the overall objective of ṣalāh is to glorify Allāh and transform one’s behaviour, so they will pick and choose opinions, even those with little to no classical backing, if it supports this stated objective. For instance, someone can adopt the view that ṣalāh can be recited in one’s native tongue because it enhances these stated objectives. One can think of many other such examples. Such an approach is of course untenable.

Moreover, it is not the role of a non-mujtahid to examine maṣāliḥ when arriving at an understanding of the ruling of Sharī‘ah on a given matter. The Shāfi‘ī jurist, Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī (909 – 974 H), explained several centuries ago: “Studying the benefits (maṣāliḥ) and harms (mafāsid) is only the function of mujtahids. As for the pure muqallid (non-mujtahid follower), it is not allowed for him to look into that and oppose the speech of his imāms…It is not allowed for a non-mujtahid to look into benefits, nor harms, but he has only to look into the speech of his imām and the imāms of his madhhab.”[18]

Similarly, Mawlānā Khālid Sayfullāh, who is referred to in several places in the document, explains with regards to the Zakāt category of “in the cause of Allāh” (fī sabīlillāh): “It is evident that to make the word of Allāh supreme maintains the position of a wisdom or benefit (maṣlaḥah), while rulings are not premised on wisdom but on the legal cause (‘illah).”[19] A somewhat more detailed discussion on this distinction between “benefit” and “legal cause” can be found in Mufti Taqi Usmani’s Uṣūl al-Iftā’ wa Adābuh.[20] As both of them clarify, the follower of a madhhab will inspect the legal cause (‘illah) of a ruling to determine what the outcome will be, as the presence or absence of the legal cause will alter the ruling; however, they may not examine underlying wisdoms or benefits with a view to alter the ruling – whereas this is precisely what the NZF document purports to do.[21]

To support the maṣāliḥ-based approach, the NZF document refers to a passage from al-Madkhal al-Mufaṣṣal of contemporary researcher Dr Ṣalāḥ Abu l-Ḥājj: “The contemporary Hanafi jurist, Dr Salah Abul Haj argues that Zakat entitlement and worthiness is focused on the attribute coined by Allah for the meta-categories and not just the physical recipients. Each meta-category is anchored on an underlying outcome and impact which is the objective of that meta-category.”[22]

The document refers to this passage of Dr Ṣalāḥ in several other places. However, this is an unjustified extrapolation from his discussion, and not what he actually states. In the passage in question, Dr Ṣalāḥ is not expressing a position on Fiqh or how to determine “Zakat entitlement”. While talking about the historical development of Fiqh, he is describing certain phenomena that the Fiqh of the Ṣaḥābah was characterised by. One such phenomenon is taking into consideration the legal causes of rulings. As an illustration of this, he refers to a discussion of Ramaḍān Būtī, which states that ‘Umar (Allāh be pleased with him) abolished the share of Zakāt for the category “mu’allafah qulūbuhum” (those whose hearts are reconciled) because the term itself shows that only if people’s hearts are won over by money should they be given from Zakāt; however, Islām had reached a stage that there was enough glory in just being a Muslim for there to be any further incentive in being offered money. Thus, the legal cause is the hearts being reconciled or won over by money, but when this legal cause was no longer found in the time of ‘Umar (Allāh be pleased with him), he abolished the share of Zakāt for mu’allafah qulūbuhum on account of the absence of its legal cause.[23]

The NZF document extrapolates from this that Dr. Ṣalāḥ was making the wider point that “Zakat entitlement and worthiness is focused on the attribute coined by Allah for the meta-categories and not just the physical recipients.” However, the most that can be derived from his discussion is that a legal cause (‘illah) must be considered when assessing the applicability of a ruling – which no one disagrees with. NZF, however, do not stop at the legal cause, but go beyond that to what they perceive to be more underlying maṣāliḥ.

Since the maṣāliḥ-based approach is an obscure and subjective method[24], and one left to the judgement of the one wielding it, it does not rule out selecting opinions that advantage oneself or one’s organisation. The three main points (centralising Zakāt, localising it and broadening its purpose) that the NZF document impresses on its readers can all be viewed as working in the self-interest of NZF: they argue Zakāt should be centralised so people are encouraged to give Zakāt to an organisation rather than distributing it themselves; they then argue it should be localised so people are encouraged to give to NZF specifically; and they further argue for broadening the purposes of Zakāt so NZF can justify paying themselves out from Zakāt money and using it in avenues they like. As will be discussed below, each of these three points are in fact selectively chosen from areas of classical disagreement; and the views they have chosen of course appear suspiciously conducive to their self-interests.

Departure from the Ḥanafī Madhhab

The majority of Muslims in the UK belong to the Ḥanafī madhhab or come from a Ḥanafī background. Yet, the NZF document makes it clear on a couple of points that they adopt views at odds with the Ḥanafī madhhab. After explaining that the three madhhabs define a legally poor person based on “kifāyah” (having sufficient means) rather than having surplus wealth below the niṣāb as the Ḥanafīs do, the NZF document makes it clear that “NZF assesses recipients and beneficiaries according to the Kifayah framework based on the understanding of the majority of the scholars.”[25] Similarly, in the Ḥanafī understanding, being legally poor (faqr) is a condition for those “in the cause of Allāh” (fī sabīlillāh) to be eligible Zakāt recipients, yet the document states: “According to most of the scholars, Faqr (poverty) is not a condition under Fi-Sabilillah. NZF’s Distribution Strategy allows for the payment directly for the costs incurred by people undertaking tasks considered to be Fi-Sabilillah regardless of the personal financial status of such individuals”[26]

Moreover, as will be shown in a section below (on “Broadening the Purposes of Zakāt”), the overall position NZF adopts on Zakāt’s purposes is fundamentally at odds with the Ḥanafī conception. Thus, despite being UK-based, and set up to serve the Muslim community in the UK, and although it at times draws from Ḥanafī scholars to support some of its points, its overall vision on Zakāt and some of the positions it adopts are at odds with the Ḥanafī madhhab, the madhhab of most UK Muslims.

The NZF document stresses that for “effective” Zakāt distribution, there are three main methods that must be employed: centralising Zakāt collection (“pooling”), localising its distribution (“focusing”) and broadening its purpose (“balancing”). Each of these three positions, and the document’s arguments in favour of them, will be looked at now in turn.

Centralising Zakāt Collection (“Pooling”)

Arguing for centralised Zakāt collection, the NZF paper states: “Zakat was traditionally collected and distributed by the legitimate authority/government. According to some schools of law, Zakat could be forcefully taken if payment was refused… The framework within which Zakat traditionally operated under an authority demonstrates its fiscal nature. One could almost argue that the payment of Zakat and Zakat distribution operate like a tax, covering some elements of public sector spending… It is worth considering the example of council tax, or membership fees for a club: without the residents and members contributing a minimum amount of funds, agreeing to suspend to a degree their involvement in the specifics of how funds should be spent to be spent centrally and holistically on their behalf, there would simply be no order nor any foundation upon which local life in a borough or the cause for which a club stands to progress meaningfully.”[27] And it states: “In the early period of Islam, Zakat collection and distribution was a governmental department and function. It was the legitimate authority or government which collected all Zakat proceeds and distributed them”[28]

There is an important distinction in the types of Zakātable wealth that the governing authority has the right to exact from their owners which the NZF paper misses out. Imām al-Māwardī (364 – 450 H) explains: “Zakātable property is of two kinds: public and private. Public wealth is what cannot be concealed like crops, fruits and livestock, while private wealth is what can be concealed like gold, silver and business stock. The one responsible for [collecting] Zakāt has no right to investigate the Zakāt of private wealth, and its owners have more right to take out its Zakāt than him, unless the owners of the [private] property wilfully give it to them and they accept it from them.”[29] Qāḍī Abū Ya‘lā al-Ḥanbalī (380 – 458 H) mentions the same, adding that Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal explicitly said that it is better for the owner of the property to distribute it himself rather than to hand it over to the ruler.[30] It should be noted that Imām Aḥmad’s view is regarding both public and private wealth.[31] In his opinion, if the owner of the wealth distributes it on his own, the imām does not have the right to demand repayment; this would also appear to be the stronger view in the Shāfi‘ī madhhab.[32]

The Ḥanafīs, on the other hand, have said the imām (central ruler) does have the right to demand repayment. However, they have expressed disagreement over why the imām has the right to forcefully extract public wealth from Zakāt-payers. Some Ḥanafī jurists said it is by virtue of the protection (ḥimāyah) he grants; and since his protection only extends to public property (amwāl ẓāhirah) and not to private property (amwāl bāṭinah), he has the right only to demand Zakāt payment from public property. Others Ḥanafī jurists said it is by virtue of his authority (wilāyah) rather than protection that he can demand their Zakāt be paid to him; and since his authority extends to both public and private wealth, he has the potential power to demand both, but it is only the public wealth that is extracted based on a certain wisdom.[33] Proponents of the latter view argue that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and Abū Bakr and ‘Umar (Allāh be pleased with them) collected both the public and private wealth, but it was in the time of ‘Uthmān (Allāh be pleased with him) that central collection came to be limited to public wealth by general agreement of the ṣaḥābah.

It seems, however, that the stronger view in the Ḥanafī school is the former, that it is by virtue of protection rather than the authority the imām wields that he acquires the right to forcefully take Zakātable wealth.[34] Thus, the imām only has the right to take the Zakāt of private wealth when he has a strong suspicion they are not paying their Zakāt[35], not because he has the intrinsic authority to do so but because he has the obligation to ensure people are fulfilling their religious obligations. The private wealth that was taken in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and Abū Bakr and ‘Umar (Allāh be pleased with them) can be explained as that exacted by the ‘āshir (street-collector), as they also grant protection to private wealth.[36]

Of course, the money we are talking about in the context of NZF is cash money, which falls under “private wealth”, and as explained this does not fall under the purview of central Zakāt collection (in that the imām has no right to demand it). Imām al-Nawawī and others have quoted consensus on this.[37]

The scholars across the madhhabs have expressed disagreement over which is superior: for Zakāt-payers to distribute money on their own or to hand it over to the central authority.[38] However, the majority have said if there is corruption and self-interest at play, it is better for Zakāt on private wealth to not be centralised, but for Zakāt-payers to distribute it on their own. This has also been expressed by some Ḥanafī jurists.[39]

Even apart from the nuanced discussion above which the NZF paper does not touch upon, there is the question over whether an organisation like NZF can be analogised to a central authority (imām). As explained, a central authority gains this function by virtue of its protection or authority; of course, an organisation like NZF neither provides protection nor possesses authority. On this issue, NZF contends that jurists in the past have argued for setting up centralised leadership where there is none. It says: “The jurists argue, in particular Ibn Abidin (d.1252 AH) quoting from Ibn al-Humam (d.861 AH), that where Muslims live in a minority, they should have a centralised body representing them and dealing with their religious affairs in a unified, centralised manner. Therefore, even if such a body does not exist to represent all the affairs of the Muslims in a particular place, organisations should emerge to at least deal with aspects of these communal concerns, like NZF is doing for Zakat.” [40] Repeating this elsewhere, it states: “In fact, the classical jurists have clearly stated that in the absence of a Muslim government, the Muslims should organise themselves where they themselves can deliver necessary functions of an Islamic government.”[41]

This, however, is a misrepresentation of what Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn and Ibn al-Humām said. They are not discussing a context in which “Muslims live as a minority” but about “some of the Muslim lands that have been overtaken by disbelievers.”[42] Quoting the same ruling from Mi‘rāj al-Dirāyah, Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn clarifies that these lands fall under Dār al-Islām (Muslim-governed territory) not Dār al-Ḥarb (non-Muslim governed territory) because the disbelievers did not hold full sway in them.[43] So it is obvious that the situation they describe does not apply to the context of Muslims in the UK.

The question they were addressing is how in these Muslim lands that have been overrun by disbelievers Muslims are to appoint the imāms for Jumu‘ah (as the imāms were selected by the central authority) and how they are to appoint a Qāḍī. On the latter there is disagreement expressed over whether they can ask the disbelieving authority to appoint a Qāḍī for them or whether they should unite around a Muslim governor who would appoint a Qāḍī.[44] On the first question, they state that if the governor in their region is a Muslim (appointed by the disbelieving authority), the imāms should be appointed by him, and if not then they should be appointed by agreement of the Muslims in that area.[45]

As one can see, this in no way translates to “the classical jurists [having] clearly stated that in the absence of a Muslim government, the Muslims should organise themselves where they themselves can deliver necessary functions of an Islamic government.” This is an example of trying to force classical positions to agree with what they are trying to push.

To further argue their point, the NZF document states: “Imam al-Dasuqi (d.1230 AH) argues that a “Jama’atul Muslimin” is equivalent to an Islamic ruler in all matters where an Islamic ruler is required.”[46] This, however, is a mistranslation. Al-Dasūqī is talking about a Qāḍī not an “Islamic ruler.” Where it is difficult to get access to a Qāḍī, in the Mālikī school a group of reliable Muslims (jamā‘at al-muslimīn al-‘udūl) can function as a Qāḍī-substitute. The context of al-Dasūqī’s discussion is about a woman seeking to annul her marriage when her husband is not spending on her – which requires a Qāḍī not an Islamic ruler.[47]

After mentioning that Zakāt has “bands” (niṣāb), was centrally collected and other such characteristics of Zakāt, the document states: “The above operational characteristics clearly demonstrate that Zakat has a systematic nature… The framework within which Zakat traditionally operated under an authority demonstrates its fiscal nature. One could almost argue that the payment of Zakat and Zakat distribution operate like a tax.”[48]

However, these aspects of Zakāt – central collection, fixed niṣāb and amounts – were only instituted after the initial obligation of Zakāt.[49] This demonstrates that these are extra rules added to facilitate Zakāt payment and are not intrinsic to its basic and overarching purpose – which was to cleanse the Zakāt-payers of sin and alleviate the suffering of the poor.[50]

Localising Zakāt (“Focusing”)

The NZF document states: “There is a strong emphasis in primary sources of Islam concerning the localising of Zakat.”[51] The “primary sources of Islam” presumably refer to the Qur’ān and Sunnah (ḥadīth). However, there is nothing explicit in either of these sources saying Zakāt is to be localised, let alone there being a “strong emphasis.” In fact, there is a ḥadīth in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī which states Mu‘ādh (Allāh be pleased with him), as the Prophet’s governor in Yemen, sent Zakāt funds to Madīnah. In the Ḥanafī madhhab, while it is encouraged to spend Zakāt locally, this is only when there isn’t greater need or one does not have needy relatives elsewhere – in these cases, it is better to spend the Zakāt elsewhere.[52]

The NZF document further states: “The classical Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali jurists believed Zakat must be distributed locally.”[53] The Arabic reference cited in the footnotes to substantiate this point states that according to these three schools it is necessary to keep Zakāt payments within a radius of the safar distance (around 55 miles) from the location of Zakāt payers. But it does not seem this is NZF’s policy: since it is a “national” Zakāt foundation, it may be that the Zakāt of people from Birmingham is distributed in London or vice versa, which is beyond the safar distance. This begs the question as to whether they are quoting these schools as authorities or to simply select from them what will feed into the narrative they seek to push and dismiss what does not?

Broadening the Purposes of Zakāt (“Balancing”)

To argue that Zakāt has a broader purpose than being a charity or a vehicle for the alleviation of poverty and suffering, the NZF document states: “Imam al-Tabari (d. 310 AH) mentions that the eight categories of Zakat expenditure can be summarised into two essential functions: Fulfilling the needs of the Muslims 2. Assisting and strengthening Islam.”[54] It reiterates this elsewhere: “The overarching objectives of Zakat as outlined by classical scholars such as Imam al-Tabari (d. 310 AH) can never be attained unless Zakat is spent across the eight categories dealing with individual needs and collective needs for Islam to flourish.”[55]

Imām al-Ṭabarī’s statement in question is on the subject of “mu’allafah qulūbuhum” (those whose hearts are reconciled) and whether they remain as a group of valid Zakāt recipients. After mentioning conflicting views of the early imāms, al-Ṭabarī says: “The correct opinion on this according to me is that Allāh has assigned Zakāt for two functions: fulfilling the needs of Muslims and secondly, assisting and strengthening Islām. Thus, whatever is for assisting and strengthening Islām, it is given to the rich and the poor.”[56]

It should be noted that al-Ṭabarī is here stating his personal view in a matter on which there is disagreement, and thus he says “according to me”. Just like the other two issues discussed above (on centralisation and localisation), NZF is being selective in what it adopts and chooses to share with its readers. Al-Ṭabarī’s view is naturally shared by some jurists, but not by others – in particular, the Ḥanafīs. Ibn Rushd (520 – 595 H) mentions in his Bidāyat al-Mujtahid that there is disagreement over the overall legal cause of Zakāt: is it need alone or is it need as well as public benefit? Both opinions exist. Ibn Rushd relates the first view from Ibn al-Qāsim amongst the early Mālikīs.[57] It is also the explicit view of the Ḥanafīs.[58]

Hence, al-Ṭabarī’s view is in conflict with that of the Ḥanafī madhhab, and in adopting it, NZF have adopted an overall position fundamentally at odds with the Ḥanafī school. This is all the more significant given that al-Ṭabarī’s statement and NZF’s deductions from it form the basis of how they choose to interpret matters relating to Zakāt recipients. Thus, they even attempt to philosophise how giving Zakāt funds to the stranded traveller (ibn al-sabīl) is not merely to alleviate need but to “serve the collective”![59]

Strangely, ignoring the explicit classical Ḥanafī position, the document goes on to state: “The contemporary senior Hanafi jurist of India, Mufti Khalid Saifullah Rahmani states: “By contemplating on the categories of Zakat, it becomes clear that the purpose of Zakat is not just to help the needy, but to also protect and safeguard Islam. Hence, the categories of Fi-Sabilillah and Mu’allafatul Qulub serve the purpose of preserving and safeguarding Islam.”[60]

Mawlānā Khālid Sayfullāh Raḥmānī states this as part of a polemic between those who argue for a more liberal reading of the category of “fī sabīlillāh” (in the cause of Allāh) as opposed to those who argue for a more restricted view. In quoting the arguments of the first group, he says: “Contemplating the avenues of Zakāt, it is realised that it principally has two purposes: one purpose is to fulfil the needs of the poor and the second purpose is to make the word of Allāh supreme.”[61] He then offers a rebuttal from the opposing side: “It is evident that to make the word of Allāh supreme maintains the position of a wisdom or benefit (maṣlaḥah), while rulings are not premised on wisdom but on the legal cause.”[62]

Even still, it is misleading to quote this opinion of Mawlānā Khālid Sayfullāh as the view of a “contemporary senior Hanafi jurist of India”, as it gives the appearance that it accords with the Ḥanafī madhhab, when it is an incontrovertible fact that the Ḥanafī madhhab states only one overall legal cause for Zakāt: poverty and need.[63]

We will now turn to three out of the eight categories of Zakāt recipients mentioned in the Qur’ān, namely the mu’allafah qulūbuhum (those whose hearts are reconciled), fī sabīlillāh (in the path of Allāh) and ‘āmilīn ‘alayhā (Zakāt administrators), and critique NZF’s positions on them.

Those Whose Hearts are Reconciled (Mu’allafah Qulūbuhum)

The category of mu’allafah qulūbuhum is briefly discussed from a Ḥanafī perspective in our previous piece on Zakāt.[64] In its discussion on mu’allafah qulūbuhum, the NZF document starts by quoting a Ḥanafī scholar, Imām al-Bābirtī. It states: “In their historical contexts, scholars interpreted this category as follows: Imam al-Babarti (d.786 AH) stated the following types of people as beneficiaries: 1) Those who were inclined to accepting Islam. 2) Those who opposed Muslims and were considered a threat. 3) Those who had just embraced Islam.”[65]

This is misleading as it suggests al-Bābirtī in his context said Zakāt should be given to these groups under the category of mu’allafah qulūbuhum. But al-Bābirtī was a Ḥanafī commenting on the passage of al-Hidāyah which states: “The [share of] mu’allafah qulūbuhum has been abolished (suqiṭa).”[66] Bābirtī then explains that there were (kānū) these three groups of mu’allafah qulūbuhum – i.e. historically, in the time of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him).

Then quoting al-Mughnī of Ibn Qudāmah, the document lists six groups of mu’allafah qulūbuhum, two belonging to disbelievers and four belonging to Muslims. What concerns us is the third category of Muslims, which NZF renders as: “Muslims who strove to defend Muslims against hostile narratives.”[67] While explaining the application of this category, the NZF document reiterates this as follows: “Ibn Qudamah states that Zakat can be paid under al-Mu’allafati Qulubuhum to a Muslim who will strive to spread Islam in the wider society and work to protect the interests of Muslims and Islam.”[68] However, this is a distortion of what Ibn Qudāmah said; he was referring to a group of Muslims at the borders of Islāmic lands who when paid from Zakāt will defend the Muslims close by to them i.e. will engage in military jihād at the frontiers.[69] As the document correctly points out, the same division mentioned by Ibn Qudāmah is found in al-Nawawī’s al-Majmū‘. Imām al-Nawawī defines this third category of Muslims as: “A group [living] next to disbelievers, if given [from Zakāt] they will fight them (qātalūhum).”[70]

This is not a minor misinterpretation, as they go on to propose based on this that Zakāt be used to fund Muslim projects that will defend Islam ideologically! They will use Zakāt for “social and educational initiatives on an interfaith or inter-community basis; publications or media projects on platforms including film, TV, press and social media,” and the condition they place is that “the applicant must substantiate on the balance of probabilities that their work is to better the public perception of Islam and Muslims.”[71] As is evident, however, there is no classical justification for giving Zakāt money to such projects; in fact, this would be opposed to the consensus of classical jurists.

Moreover, one who reads the discussion in al-Nawawī’s Majmū‘ (which the NZF document refers to) will find the discussion to be more nuanced. Not all the six groups mentioned under mu’allafah qulūbuhum are accepted as valid Zakāt recipients. There is disagreement over some of these groups within the Shāfi‘ī madhhab, with the correct view for both groups of disbelievers being that they are not valid beneficiaries.[72] Similar disagreements exist in the Ḥanbalī madhhab.[73]

To further argue for their position that Zakāt funds can be used in the manner they propose for mu’allafah qulūbuhum, they state: “Imam al-Hattab (d.954 AH) from the Maliki school argues that the assessment of a beneficiary under al-Mu’allafati Qulubuhum is at the discretion of the authority disbursing Zakat.”[74] Again, this is a misinterpretation of what was said. Al-Ḥaṭṭāb is talking in the context of the amount that is given to the beneficiaries of Zakāt, not about determining who the beneficiary is. He quotes an earlier text which states, “The debtor will be given the amount of his debt, the poor and needy what suffices them and their dependents, the stranded the amount that will make him reach his destination or the place of his wealth, the fighter the amount that will sustain him while fighting, the reconciled based on discretion, and the collector a standard wage.”[75] It appears NZF is trying to use al-Ḥaṭṭāb’s passage to justify specifying who they want under “mu’allafah qulūbuhum” even if it goes against the classical consensus. But al-Ḥaṭṭāb’s passage obviously does not allow for this interpretation.

In attempting to justify spending Zakāt on the mu’allafah qulūbuhum according to the Ḥanafī school, the document says: “Among the Hanafi scholars, there is a difference of opinion in respect to this meta-category. Some Hanafi jurists have suggested this category has been abrogated whilst others have clearly stated that this meta-category is not abrogated, but that it is dependent on the existence of an ‘illa (effective legal cause).”[76]

The Ḥanafī madhhab is clear that the share of Zakāt for “mu’allafah qulūbuhum” has been “abolished” (suqiṭa). There is disagreement over why it has been abolished. Some, like ‘Alā’ al-Dīn al-Samarqandī (ca. 470 – 539 H), said it was abrogated, and al-Ḥaṣkafī suggests that it was abrogated in the lifetime of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) based on his statement in two well-known ḥadīths that Zakāt is taken from the rich and given to the poor.[77]

Others have said their share is abolished because the legal cause that made them entitled to Zakāt has terminated. It appears, however, that the Ḥanafī jurists that proposed this were not arguing that if the legal cause reappears, the mu’allafah qulūbuhum would again become valid beneficiaries. Rather, it appears they understood the legal cause in this case to have terminated indefinitely. When the numbers of Muslims became many – which continues to this day – and it was no longer realistically possible to annihilate Muslims, the desperate situation in which the Prophet had to make pay-outs to those who could be harmful to Muslims came to an end. Hence, al-Taḥāwī (239 – 321 H) states the mu’allafah qulūbuhum “have disappeared” (dhahabū)[78] and Imām Muḥammad (132 – 189 H) says in al-Aṣl regarding giving Zakāt to the mu’allafah qulūbuhum that “this was only something in the time of the Prophet.”[79]

Al-Jaṣṣāṣ (305 – 370 H) makes this clear: “Our imāms [Abū Ḥanīfah and his disciples] have said: [The mu’allafah qulūbuhum] were only in the period of the Messenger of Allāh (Allāh bless him and grant him peace) at the early stages of Islām in the situation of the numbers of Muslims being few and their enemies being many, and Allāh has strengthened Islām and its adherents and made them free of reconciling with disbelievers. If they later are in need of that, this is only because of their abandonment of jihād, and when they unite and strengthen one another, they would not need to be reconciled with others by means of wealth given to them from the wealth of Muslims. Something similar to the view of our imāms has been narrated from a multitude of the predecessors.”[80]

In commenting on this passage of al-Jaṣṣāṣ, the NZF document states: “Imam al-Jassas (d. 370 AH) states that Ta’lif al-Qulub is an option to gain currency and recognition when there is a lack of alternative strategies or options. It is a pre-emptive measure when more proactive measures are not possible.”[81] However, al-Jaṣṣāṣ of course says nothing of the sort. He is not saying giving Zakāt to win over people to the cause of Islām is an option when there is a lack of alternative strategies. Rather, he is saying there is no option to give them Zakāt at all, and if there ever is a time when Muslims find themselves in need of this, it is only because they have neglected jihād, and so need to put their act together by uniting and strengthening each other. To say al-Jaṣṣāṣ was arguing that in this situation Muslims can resort to using Zakāt for mu’allafah qulūbuhum would be a complete reversal of what he said.

Moreover, it is clear that in the Ḥanafī school it is only the ruler or his representatives who have the right, as representatives and caretakers of the poor, to distribute Zakāt to this category.[82] Al-Qudūrī states that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) only gave it to repel harm to the poor[83] – so ultimately it was the needs of the poor and needy that was being considered. He also points out that it would in principal not be allowed in the Ḥanafī school to give Zakāt to mu’allafah qulūbhum who are legally rich, as a fundamental Ḥanafī principle is that Zakāt cannot be given to the legally rich.[84]

While arguing that in the Ḥanafī madhhab, the share of mu’allafah qulūbuhum has not been abrogated, the document states: “Maulana Abdul Hayy al-Laknawi (d.1304 AH) states that this category is not abrogated, rather, the ‘illa was not present. This can obviously be understood in the context of these jurists who wrote, researched and lived in a polity of Muslims where Islam was well-established.”[85]

Mawlānā ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī lived under British rule and at a time of crippling Muslim power. Furthermore, great Ḥanafī jurists of recent times like Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī, Muftī ‘Azizur Raḥmān Deobandī, Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī Thānawī, Mawlānā Ẓafar Aḥmad Thanāwī, Muftī Muḥammad Shafī and Muftī Kifāyatullāh lived after the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate and at a time of dwindling Muslim power, yet none of them suggested reviving the category of the mu’allafah qulūbuhum. As explained above, giving Zakāt money to mu’allafah qulūbuhum who are legally rich is something fundamentally at odds with Ḥanafī principles of Zakāt distribution.

In the Cause of Allāh (Fī Sabīlillāh)

Classically, there were two main groups that were said to fall under the Zakāt category of “in the cause of Allāh” (fī sabīlillāh) – those participating in military jihād and those undertaking ḥajj. The first is agreed-upon and the second is disputed.[86] The second group – those undertaking ḥajj – is conspicuous in the NZF document only by its absence. The NZF document mentions all kinds of views, with an attempt to broaden the scope of each category, but fails to mention ḥajj within the category of “in the cause of Allāh” – which was historically a well-known position. It seems this was designed to fit their overall, highly selective, narrative of trying to give all the beneficiaries of Zakāt a more secular, communal, function, rather than a ritual, devotional one.

While conceding that the jurists agree “in the cause of Allāh” means military engagement, they state, “but this does not mean military engagement was the purpose of the meta-category – it was a means to a greater objective.” The “greater objective” is “advancing the cause of devotion to Allah in society” where the “methods of achieving this and countering external threats to a Muslim community depend heavily on the context.”[87] Thus they state that in our context they will fund under this category: “youth engagement projects, parenting initiatives, tarbiyah courses and awareness projects… Islamic colleges and institutes… Madrasahs/maktabs… exceptional existing or emerging scholars with maintenance, further education and research funding.”[88] As explained earlier under the heading, “A Maṣāliḥ Based Approach?”, it is a fundamental methodological error to derive rulings based on maṣāliḥ, rather than the explicitly stated rulings and their legal causes.

Referring to Mawlānā Zakariyyā Kandhlewī’s comments on “fī sabīlillāh” having a broader meaning, the NZF document states: “Although Shaykh Zakariyya Khandelwi was discussing the general verses of Jihad and Tabligh Jama’at, he specifically quotes the verse of Zakat and alludes to the debate of the scholars regarding the beneficiaries under Fi-Sabilillah. Shaykh Zakariyya’s insight begs the question: if the general, explicit verses of Qital and Jihad can refer to non-military endeavours, then why would an interpreted verse of Fi-Sabilliah not allow non-military endeavours, especially in our current context when the notion of military engagement is of course an irrelevance?”[89]

It is of course a strange thing to say in a world ravaged by war and conflict that “military engagement is of course an irrelevance”. The Ḥanafīs have historically differed over who is entitled to Zakāt under “fī sabīlillāh”, with the dominant positions being a fighter who is cut-off from his wealth or a person on ḥajj who is cut-off from his wealth; with a minority holding that they are “seekers of sacred knowledge” (ṭalabat al-‘ilm).[90] The broadest definition is given by al-Kāsānī as “all who strive in the obedience of Allāh and in the path of virtues when they are in need.”[91] But for Ḥanafīs (including Mawlānā Zakariyyā Kāndhlewī), this disagreement does not amount to anything of substance, because as Ibn al-Humām said “the disagreement on this does not entail any difference in ruling since there is agreement that all categories besides the collector are given [Zakāt] on condition of legal poverty.”[92] Mawlānā Zakariyyā himself mentions that according to Ḥanafīs, legal poverty is a condition for paying Zakāt to those who fall under the category of fī sabīlillāh.[93]

In short, because the Ḥanafīs add the condition of legal poverty, the disagreement over who is included under “fī sabīlillāh” does not amount to anything substantive. The other madhhabs which do not put this condition limit the category of “fī sabīlillāh” to those engaging in military jihad or to those participating in ḥajj. As mentioned earlier, NZF does not take the Ḥanafī position that legal poverty is a condition for giving Zakāt to those who belong to this category. But, at the same time, it does not restrict the category to those mentioned in the other three madhhabs. Thus, they state it is acceptable to give Zakāt to a student who is legally rich, for example. It is clear that this combination (talfīq) results in a ruling that is at odds with the classical consensus.

However, the NZF document tries to find some support for their view (of giving Zakāt to students who are legally rich) from some Ḥanafī jurists. Thus, they write: “Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider certain scholarly activities in defence and propagation of faith to fall under the purview of Fi-Sabilillah…This interpretation is supported by some classical Hanafi jurists”[94]

In the footnote (footnote number 97), the document quotes some Ḥanafī sources, primarily Minḥat al-Khāliq and Radd al-Muḥtār, both by Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn, a superficial reading of which may suggest that a student who is legally rich can receive Zakāt.

Ibn al-Humām and ‘Umar Ibn Nujaym mention there is consensus in the Ḥanafī madhhab that all recipients of Zakāt can only receive Zakāt on condition of poverty. In Minḥat al-Khāliq, Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn says, commenting on this, that there are two late sources that suggest a student who is legally rich can receive Zakāt, and this violates the stated consensus. The two late sources are in fact quoting earlier, more authoritative, works: al-Wāqi‘āt of al-Ṣadr al-Shahīd and al-Mabsūṭ of al-Sarakhsī. The ascription to al-Wāqi‘āt is by an unknown person mentioned by al-Tumurtāshī (d. 1007 H). The ascription to al-Mabsūṭ is mentioned by the relatively unknown 9th century Turkish scholar, Qaraq Amīr al-Ḥumaydī, in his Jāmi‘ al-Fatāwā.[95] Hence, these two sources ascribe to al-Mabsūṭ and al-Wāqi‘āt the view that a student who is “rich” (ghanī) can receive Zakāt.[96] This however is a misattribution. Both these latter works are available, and neither of them mention any such thing.[97] In fact, while explaining a ḥadīth that suggests a fighter who is “rich” can receive Zakāt, al-Sarakhsī states in al-Mabsūṭ that “rich” here does not mean legally rich, but rich in the sense of being able and having the means to earn.[98]

As mentioned by al-Sarakhsī, sometimes “rich” is interpreted as having physical strength and the ability/means to earn a living while not necessarily owning surplus wealth above the niṣāb. Moreover, sometimes “rich” is interpreted as owning surplus wealth above niṣāb but not having access to this wealth, and thus being legally poor.[99] In Radd al-Muḥtār, Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn makes it clear that if the statements found in these late works stating that “even if a student of sacred knowledge is rich” he can receive Zakāt is taken literally, then as al-Ṭaḥṭāwī said before him, “no one regards it to be reliable”; but he says, it is best to interpret “rich” in terms of having physical strength and the ability/means to earn a living – thus it does not preclude the individual being legally poor and eligible for receiving Zakāt.[100]

In sum, by adopting the view that a student who is legally rich can receive Zakāt under the category of “fī sabīlillāh”, NZF have opposed the consensus of the classical scholars.

Zakāt Adminstrators (‘Ᾱmilīna ‘Alayhā)

The early works of the Ḥanafī madhhab make it clear that the Zakāt administrators who are entitled to receive a share of the Zakāt as wages for their work are those that are “appointed by the imām (central ruler)”.[101] NZF argues that an organisation can construct a similar relation to that found between an imām and the poor, and thus can function as “‘āmilīn ‘alayhā”. They write: “If an organisation can construct a similar relationship in today’s context without an Imam, the service providers can potentially be ‘Amilina ‘Alayha. This is affirmed by the Fatwa of the contemporary senior South African scholar, Mufti Ridha al-Haqq…In another Fatwa regarding fundraisers for Islamic educational seminaries and Darul Ulooms, Mufti Ridha al-Haqq states that the fundraisers are in the ruling of ‘Amilina ‘Alayha. He quotes a number of senior sub-continent scholars who held the same opinion, such as Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanwi, Mufti Shafi Uthmani, Maulana Khalil Saharanpuri, Mufti Kifayatullah and Mufti Khalid Saifullah. He mentions that their view was of Madrasah fundraisers being ‘Amilina ‘Alayha.”[102]

The reference to the senior scholars of Deoband (Mawlānā Thānawī, Muftī Muḥammad Shafī‘ and Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī) is based on a discussion found in Muftī Muḥammad Shafī‘’s Imdād al-Muftīn.[103] Muftī Muḥammad Shafī‘ explains that if a Zakāt-payer were to give his Zakāt to be distributed by an agent, his duty of Zakāt would not be discharged until the Zakāt falls into the hands of valid beneficiaries. However, for the government-appointed collectors, since they function as representatives of the poor by divine appointment, once the Zakāt is handed over to them, Zakāt has been discharged.[104] For those that are not ‘āmilīn (government-appointed Zakāt collectors), a similar rule will apply to agents (wakīls) of the poor. Hence, if someone collects Zakāt on behalf of a poor person by the poor person’s appointment, the Zakāt is discharged immediately upon handing it over to the agent.

Muftī Shafī‘ draws on the insight of Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī who said that in subcontinent madrasas, there is a general understanding that the chancellors are responsible for the students and are their agents in collecting and receiving Zakāt on their behalf. Hence, even without explicit appointment from the poor students, the chancellor and madrasa will acquire the status of being their agents by tacit appointment.[105] (Muftī Shafī‘ also supports this view from the views of Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī and Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī Thānawī.) Of course, this does not apply to an organisation like NZF where there is no automatic assumption that the poor have appointed them as their agents.

A Note on Ḥīlahs and the Wakālah Model

Recognising that their positions on the three categories discussed above (mu’allafah qulūbuhum, fī sabīlillāh and ‘āmilīna ‘alayhā) are problematic, NZF have devised a legal strategy (ḥilah) to make the Zakāt legally valid. The document states: “Although the application and understanding of categories 3, 4 and 7 are contested among the different schools of Fiqh, NZF has worked with Wakalah to ensure Zakat payments are valid, especially from the perspective of the Hanafi school. With the Wakalah model in place, NZF is continuously exploring and researching these two categories [see Appendix 3 for an explanation of the Wakalah model].”[106] The wakālah model works by acquiring a signed statement from eligible recipients that they give NZF powers to distribute Zakāt money allocated to them at NZF’s discretion. Hence, NZF will acquire autonomy, based on the appointment of the eligible recipient, to use the Zakāt funds as it chooses.

Ḥanafī jurists have suggested ḥīlahs in exceptional cases for the construction of a masjid, for the shrouding of a deceased etc. They have suggested that Zakāt money is given to the poor and then they are asked to spend it on that cause. Drawing on these legal stratagems mentioned by Ḥanafī jurists, the NZF document states: “The above are obviously not dire causes. A masjid is not necessary, Salah can be performed without a Masjid and even without a construction…A stratagem for ‘shrouding’ shows that the Wakalah model is not restricted to ‘dire causes’. In all of these, Sadaqah funds could have been used, however, the jurists do not mention any alternative nor offer an alternative. They allow the spending of Zakat through the Wakalah model to fulfil the need. Thus, the permission seems to be in a context of need. NZF adopts a similar model, unlike supporting causes beyond the eight categories as quoted in the above texts such as building bridges and shrouding, NZF apply the Wakalah model in applying meta-categories 3,4 and 7.”[107]

When spending on a masjid, shrouding the deceased etc., no one will assume these are direct avenues of Zakāt distribution, but they will be correctly viewed as exceptions from normal practice, and the ḥilah is adopted to facilitate this exceptional practice. The ḥīlah that NZF proposes is not for exceptional cases, but is being suggested as a default for certain kinds of recipients. Moreover, some of these recipients are not valid beneficiaries by consensus of the classical jurists, like a student who is legally rich or people who work in inter-faith projects. Thus, the ḥīlah here is being used to deny the right that is afforded to the poor and shifting it to others. Such a ḥīlah is of course unacceptable. According to a passage from al-Tatārkhāniyyah quoted in the fourth appendix of the NZF document: “Every hīlah which a man devises to nullify the right of another or to put doubt in it or to coat falsehood, it is reprehensible. According to al-‘Uyūn and Jāmi‘ al-Fatāwā it is not permissible.”[108] This is of course precisely what the ḥīlah devised by NZF amounts to; hence even with this ḥīlah in place, it would not be Islāmically acceptable to pay Zakāt to them.

Zakāt is an Act of Worship

In the first appendix of the document, an impression is given that Zakāt is as a default something “non-ritualistic” (ma‘qūl al-ma‘nā). Rulings that are non-ritualistic have identifiable legal causes that can be extended to other situations. Rulings that are ritualistic (ta‘abbudī), while there may be some general intelligible purpose to them, do not have defined legal causes that can be extended beyond them; in other words, they are practised ritualistically. The default in rulings related to acts of worship (‘ibādāt) is that they are ritualistic[109], although there are some laws that are non-ritualistic on which analogy can be made (e.g. the prostration of forgetfulness [sujūd al-sahw] is only found in scriptural sources for limited cases, but is extrapolated to other kinds of mistakes made in ṣalāh). As one of the most important acts of worship, Zakāt is fundamentally and by default a matter of ritual, although of course there are elements of it that are non-ritualistic.

Concluding Comments

From the detailed critique above, it is clear that NZF has presented a highly selective and distorted reading of the institution of Zakāt. In doing so, they have misrepresented traditional opinions and have adopted a highly problematic Fiqh methodology – all of which is of course detrimental for consumers of such a message. There are other points in the document that could have been critiqued, but as mentioned in the introduction, it was not the aim of this review to be exhaustive.

There are also clear examples of errors and sloppiness in research. For instance, Muṣṭafā al-Zarqā’s death is stated as 1357 H[110], while this was the year of death of his father; Muṣtafā al-Zarqā died in 1420 H (1999 CE). Similarly, al-Shurunbulālī’s death is stated in one place as 1231 H[111], while his actual year of death was 1069 H. In one place, the document quotes from al-Kirmānī that “Salat and Zakat have more importance and emphasis due to their year-round manifestation.”[112] The Arabic wording of this alleged statement was not mentioned in the references and nor was a clear citation given. Nonetheless, it is obvious that this is incorrect as fasting in Ramaḍān also has a “year-round manifestation”, and the timings of ṣalāh are not “year-round” but daily.[113]

The reason for pointing out these mistakes is to demonstrate that NZF’s unscrupulous approach to Fiqh seems to extend to the accuracy of their research. This is of course important to know for people who wish to decide whether to trust NZF scholarship. Even though the document mentions that it is the product of 12-months of intense research, given the above, Muslims would be better off relying on the tried-and-tested knowledge of the great and authoritative imāms and mujtahids of the past.

Many Muslims are naturally distressed at the poor state of Muslims throughout the world. Improving our state will only be achieved through true obedience to Allāh, submitting to His commands as they are, and putting them into practice to the best of our ability.[114] It is not by “reforming” or refashioning Islām’s laws in accordance with what we feel they should be that will result in Allāh’s assistance; rather, it is only by submitting to Allāh’s laws as they are that will bring His help. May Allāh make us recognise truth as truth and enable us to follow it, and make us recognise falsehood as falsehood and enable us to abstain from it.

A Summary of Important Points

Since the above critique is lengthy and some readers will not be able to read it in its entirety, we have noted down the main points of criticism in the following bullet points:

• NZF adopts an agenda-driven pick-and-choose Fiqh methodology.
• It takes a subjective “maṣāliḥ-based approach” to Fiqh, where assumed benefits (maṣāliḥ) of Zakāt are used to assess which opinions it will select. However, rulings are not premised on benefits but on legal causes (‘ilal).
• The three main points NZF argues for (centralising Zakāt, localising it and broadening its purpose) are suspiciously conducive to its self-interests.
• Although most Muslims in the UK belong to the Ḥanafī madhhab or come from a Ḥanafī background, NZF departs from the Ḥanafī madhhab in both its overall narrative on Zakāt and on specific issues.
• It refers to how Zakāt was historically centralised but omits to mention that private wealth (amwāl bāṭinah), which includes cash, was not subject to centralisation.
• The central authority acquires the right of exacting Zakāt wealth by virtue of the protection it grants or the authority it wields, while an organisation like NZF neither grants protection nor wields authority.
• Scholars have historically differed over whether it is better for Zakāt-payers to distribute Zakāt on their own or to hand it over to the central authority – NZF does not mention this.
• Ḥanafī jurists discuss how Muslims in Muslim lands overrun by disbelievers are to conduct some of their affairs. NZF misapplies this to non-Muslim lands.
• NZF misquotes Imām al-Dasūqī as saying a reliable group of Muslims can function as a substitute to the Islamic ruler in his absence, whereas he was in fact saying that they can function as a substitute to a Qāḍī.
• NZF refers to certain features of Zakāt payment that “demonstrates its fiscal nature”, but these features were only instituted after the initial obligation of Zakāt, demonstrating that they are not intrinsic to the basic purpose of Zakāt but are faciliatory.
• It claims that there is a strong emphasis in the primary sources of Islām on localising Zakāt, while there is nothing explicit in the Qur’ān or Sunnah on localising Zakāt; on the other hand, there is an explicit ḥadīth mentioning Zakāt was sent from Yemen to Madīnah in the Prophet’s lifetime.
• NZF refers to the views of the Shāfi‘ī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī madhhabs on the obligation of localising Zakāt distribution but omits to mention that localisation for them meant to keep it within a radius of the safar distance, which is narrower than keeping it within the “nation”.
• NZF quotes Imām al-Ṭabarī’s opinion that there are two broad purposes of Zakāt, helping the needy and strengthening Islām, but this is his personal view at odds with other jurists, particularly the Ḥanafīs.
• NZF quotes the Ḥanafī jurist, al-Bābirtī, in a misleading way, giving the impression that he believed the category of mu’allafah qulūbuhum are still valid beneficiaries of Zakāt.
• It quotes Ibn Qudāmah as saying that one of the groups within the category of mu’allafah qulūbuhum are “those who will strive to spread Islam in the wider society and work to protect the interests of Muslims”, but Ibn Qudāmah says nothing of the sort; he was talking about Muslims who will be encouraged to fight disbelievers in close proximity to them if given Zakāt money.
• Its view that Zakāt funds can be given to projects that help improve the image of Islām (under the category of mu’allafah qulūbuhum) is opposed to the consensus of classical jurists.
• It misquotes al-Ḥaṭṭāb as saying that beneficiaries under mu’allafah qulūbuhum are determined at the discretion of the authority dispensing Zakāt; whereas he was in fact saying that the amount of Zakāt they are given is at their discretion, not who they are.
• It misquotes al-Jaṣṣāṣ as allowing Zakāt distribution to mu’allafah qulūbuhum when alternative strategies do not work, whereas his statement is clear that the mu’allafah qulūbuhum are no longer valid beneficiaries; he only states that if Muslims ever feel a need to revive them that is only due to their own negligence.
• It argues Mawlānā ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī only believed the mu’allafah qulūbuhum were not valid beneficiaries because he “lived in a polity of Muslims where Islam was well-established”, whereas he lived in India under British rule at a time of crippling Muslim power.
• Based on what it views as “the greater objective” of fighting in Allāh’s cause, NZF argues Zakāt can be given to youth engagement projects, scholars (even when they are legally rich) etc., which is opposed to the consensus of classical scholars.
• It asserts that “in our current context” “the notion of military engagement is of course an irrelevance”, despite living in a world ravaged by war and conflict.
• Two late Ḥanafī sources, one quoted by al-Tumurtāshī and the other Jāmi‘ al-Fatāwā, misquote two earlier references (al-Mabsūṭ and al-Wāqi‘āt) as allowing payment of Zakāt to a student who is “rich”. Ibn ‘Ᾱbidīn explains that if these late sources are taken literally, no one has relied on them, but he argues it is best to interpret “rich” in a way that does not discount them as being legally poor. The NZF document, however, suggests some Ḥanafī jurists have allowed Zakāt to be spent on rich students.
• Drawing on ḥīlahs (legal stratagems) devised by Ḥanafī jurists for exceptional circumstances as justification, NZF outlines a ḥīlah that they have devised. Their ḥīlah however is not only for exceptional circumstances and is designed to nullify the right of others, which has been explicitly described as impermissible by the jurists.
• The NZF documents suggests Zakāt is something fundamentally non-ritualistic, whereas, as an act of worship, it is fundamentally ritualistic.
• There are several examples of sloppy errors, including mistaken dates given for the death of scholars.

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Footnotes:

[1] www.nzf.org.uk/Content/PDF/NZF_Our_Zakat_Distribution_Strategy_May_2018.pdf

[2] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 13

[3] See, in particular, the sections, “Departure from the Ḥanafī Madhhab” and “Broadening the Purposes of Zakāt”, below

[4] Fatāwā wa Masā’il Ibn al-Ṣalāḥ, Dār al-Ma‘rifah, p. 63

[5] Al-Sayf al-Maslūl, Dār al-Fatḥ, p. 389

[6] Al-Mi‘yār al-Mu‘rib, Wizārat al-Awqāf, 11:164

[7] Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, Dār al-Minhāj, 4:600-603; Tartīb al-Madārik, 1:62-3. Note: Situations of genuine need (ḍarūrah) are an exception to this rule.

[8] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 49

[9] Ibid.

[10] Uṣūl al-Iftā’ wa Ᾱdābuh, Maktabah Ma‘ārif al-Qur’ān, p. 71

[11] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 49

[12] Al-Muhannad ‘ala l-Mufannad, Dār al-Fatḥ, p. 58; for signatures and endorsements of Shaykh al-Hind and Mawlānā Thānawī, see: p. 100, 103

[13] “Ḍarūrah” in this context can be defined as something which causes life to become extremely difficult.

[14] al-Ḥīlah al-Nājizah, Dār al-Ishā‘at, p. 14-5

[15] Juhd al-Muqill, 2:82

[16] theislamiclens.wordpress.com/2017/07/25/understanding-modernism-thoughts-on-muhammad-nizamis-essay-misunderstanding-traditionalism/

theislamiclens.wordpress.com/2017/08/18/rejoinder-to-muhammad-nizamis-choosing-tradition-over-traditionalism/

ahlussunnah.boards.net/thread/380/anaf-muft-today-transmitters-capable

ahlussunnah.boards.net/thread/374/al-sh-ib-on-madhhab

ahlussunnah.boards.net/thread/379/brief-explanation-on-necessity-madhab

[17] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 30

[18] al-Fatāwā al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kubrā, 3:24

[19] Jadīd Fiqhī Masā’il, 2:81

[20] Uṣūl al-Iftā’ wa Adābuh, p. 241-248

[21] For more on the subject of contextualising the rulings of the madhhab based on the presence or absence of the legal cause, see the following responses to Muahmmad Nizami:

theislamiclens.wordpress.com/2017/07/25/understanding-modernism-thoughts-on-muhammad-nizamis-essay-misunderstanding-traditionalism/

theislamiclens.wordpress.com/2017/08/18/rejoinder-to-muhammad-nizamis-choosing-tradition-over-traditionalism/

[22] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 10

[23] Al-Madkhal al-Mufaṣṣal, Dār al-Fatḥ, p. 82; it should be noted that Dr Ṣalāḥ does not quote any primary source for this historical incident or for the explanation offered.

[24] As an example, one could just as easily make the overall objective of Zakāt the elimination of stinginess and greed and then shape all rulings of Zakāt around that.

[25] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 35

[26] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 41

[27] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 11-2

[28] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 13

[29] al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, Dār Ibn Qutaybah, p. 145

[30] al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyyah, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, p. 115

[31] Al-Mughnī, Dār ‘Ᾱlam al-Kutub, 4:92; Awjaz al-Masālik, Dār al-Qalam, 6:304

[32] Al-Majmū‘ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, Maktabat al-Irshād, 6:137

[33] Al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, Idārat al-Qur’ān, 3:223

[34] Ibid. 3:224

[35] Al-Tajrīd, 3:1159; Tuḥfat al-Fuqahā’, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1:275

[36] Al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, 3:253; Awjaz al-Masālik, 5:633

[37] Sharh Muhadhdhab, 6:137; Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj, 3:334; Jawāhir al-Fiqh, 3:181

[38] Al-Mughnī, 4:92; Awjaz al-Masālik, 6:304

[39] Al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2:390

[40] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 13-4

[41] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 22

[42] Radd al-Muḥtār, Dār ‘Ᾱlam al-Kutub, 8:43

[43] Ibid. 3:14

[44] Radd al-Muḥtār, Dār ‘Ᾱlam al-Kutub, 8:44

[45] Ibid. 3:14

[46] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 22

[47] Ḥāshiyat al-Dasūqī ‘ala l-Sharḥ al-Kabīr, 2:518-9

[48] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 12

[49] Jawāhir al-Fiqh, 3:186

[50] See our earlier piece on the subject of Zakāt’s purpose: www.basair.net/zakat-purpose-objectives-hanafi-school/

[51] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 14

[52] www.basair.net/zakat-purpose-objectives-hanafi-school/

[53] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 16

[54] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 10

[55] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 18

[56] Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī, Dār Hajr, 11:523

[57] Bidāyat al-Mujtahid, Dār al-Salām, p. 649-50

[58] See: www.basair.net/zakat-purpose-objectives-hanafi-school/

[59] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 31

[60] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 10

[61] Jadīd Fiqhī Masā’il, Zamzam Publishers, 2:78

[62] Jadīd Fiqhī Masā’il, 2:81

[63] See: www.basair.net/zakat-purpose-objectives-hanafi-school/

[64] www.basair.net/zakat-purpose-objectives-hanafi-school/

[65] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 23

[66] Al-‘Ināyah, 2:14

[67] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 23

[68] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 39

[69] Al-Mughnī, 9:318

[70] Al-Majmū‘ Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, 6:180

[71] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 40-1

[72] Al-Majmū Sharḥ al-Muhadhdhab, 6:181

[73] Al-Inṣāf, 3:228

[74] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 40

[75] Al-Mawāhib al-Jalīl, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 3:229

[76] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 23

[77] See: www.basair.net/zakat-purpose-objectives-hanafi-school

[78] Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar al-Ṭaḥāwī, Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyyah, 2:373

[79] Al-Aṣl, Wizārat al-Awqāf, 2:142

[80] Aḥkām al-Qur’ān, Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-‘Arabī, 4:325

[81] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 25

[82] Awjaz al-Masālik, 6:77

[83] Tajrīd, 8:4216-7

[84] Ibid.

[85] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 24

[86] Al-Mughnī, 9:326-8

[87] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 28

[88] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 42

[89] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 29

[90] Radd al-Muḥtār, Dār ‘Ᾱlam al-Kutub, 3:289

[91] Ibid.; Badā’i‘ al-Ṣanā’i‘, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2:471

[92] Fatḥ al-Qadīr, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2:269; al-Nahr al-Fā’iq, Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2:461; Radd al-Muḥtār, Dār ‘Ᾱlam al-Kutub, 3:289

[93] Awjaz al-Masālik, 6:79

[94] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 29

[95] Jāmi‘ al-Fatāwā, p. 211-2

[96] Minḥat al-Khāliq on the margins of al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq, 2:260

[97] A manuscript of al-Wāqi‘āt is available at the following link: www.mediafire.com/file/71htt5d0nj49gb2 (courtesy of Mufti Husain Kadodia)

[98] Al-Mabsūṭ, 3:10

[99] Al-Badā’i‘ al-Ṣanā’i‘, 2:473

[100] Radd al-Muḥtār, 3:286

[101] Al-Mabsūṭ, 3:9; al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhānī, 3:209

[102] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 22

[103] Imdād al-Muftīn, Dār al-Ishā‘at, p. 891-896

[104] Imdād al-Muftīn, Dār al-Ishā‘at, p. 891-2

[105] Ibid. p. 895; Tazkirat al-Rashīd, 1:165

[106] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 45

[107] Ibid.

[108] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 51

[109] Muwāfaqat, 2:513

[110] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 38

[111] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 45

[112] “Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 9

[113] Another example of sloppiness is the following: “The Hanafi jurists gave various stratagems to allow Zakat payments to serve individual and ensure communal needs. For example: 1. Imam al-Shurunbulali (d. 1231 AH) in respect to funding the construction costs of Masjids with Zakat. He states that a needy person should be given Zakat and then instructed to spend on the building costs of the Masjid. 2. In Muhit al-Burhani, the author states that the way to use Zakat funds for construction of a masjid, a bridge or paying the debt off a deceased person or shrouding, is to pay Zakat to a needy person, and thereafter instruct him to spend in the above causes.” (“Our Zakat Distribution Strategy”, p. 45) While these are presented as two separate stratagems, they are in fact one and the same. In the Arabic passage that is quoted from al-Shurunbulāli in the reference, it is made clear that he is quoting al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq which in turn is quoting al-Muḥīṭ al-Burhāni. Thus, the two separate citations given are of an original source and a later source quoting that very same source!

[114] Aḥsan al-Fatāwā, 6:47

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Taken from HERE

What is Ikhtilāṭ?

As the “human being has been created weak” (Qur’ān, 4:28) and “no temptation (fitnah) is greater for men than women” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 5096), the Sharī‘ah has placed strict safeguards against men and women interacting. One of these safeguards is the prohibition of unnecessary mixing (mukhālaṭah, ikhtilāṭ, imtizāj, ijtimā‘) between non-elderly men and women, something upheld by the vast majority of the classical jurists. Mixing refers to there being no segregation between men and women; that is, men and women are together in the same place, and don’t have their own areas or seating places. Unfortunately, due mainly to influences of non-Islāmic systems of morality, many Muslims have become very relaxed with regards to this ruling. Some even oppose and ridicule it.

Ḥijāb

Ḥijāb primarily means to screen women from men but also has the secondary meaning of being fully covered when a woman’s person is exposed to onlookers due to some need, e.g. on the streets, in the markets or during Ḥajj. The obligation of Ḥijāb began towards the end of the 5th year of Hijrah with the revelation of verses in Sūrat al-Aḥzāb. From this time onward, care was taken to ensure non-elderly men and women do not unnecessarily intermingle or mix.

The Example of ‘Ᾱ’ishah (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhā) During the Incident of Slander

The incident of slander (ifk) referred to in verses of Sūrat al-Nūr occurred in the 6th year of Hijrah, after the revelation of Ḥijāb. Thus, while explaining its background, ‘Ᾱ’ishah (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhā) said: “I had come out with the Messenger of Allāh (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) after Ḥijāb was revealed and thus I was carried in a hawdaj and put down in it.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 4750; Fatḥ al-Bārī, Dār Ṭaybah, 10:386) ‘Ᾱ’ishah’s (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhā) person was completely concealed in the hawdaj. Ibn Ḥajar explains:
When later in the journey ‘Ᾱ’ishah (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhā) returned from searching for her misplaced necklace to find the caravan had left, she explains:
This demonstrates that after the revelation of Ḥijāb, extreme care was taken to ensure men did not see women in general circumstances, while in cases of necessity she was covered fully.

Non-Observance of Ḥijāb before its Obligation Cannot be Advanced as Evidence

There are narrations of Ṣaḥābah drinking wine in the time of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) or engaging in mut‘ah marriage. These narrations obviously cannot be advanced as evidence as they occurred before the prohibition of these acts. Similarly, it will be mistaken to use incidents before the revelation of Ḥijāb as proof for the permissibility of unnecessary mixing. Likewise, incidents in which elderly women are in reference are not evidence that this would be allowed for non-elderly women. For example, Sahl ibn Sa‘d (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhumā) explained that the young Ṣaḥābah came to eat at a woman’s house after Jumu‘ah, and in one version, it is clarified that she was an elderly woman (‘ajūz). (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 6248)

Women’s Attendance of Congregational Ṣalāh in the Time of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam)

The congregational Ṣalāh that would take place in the time of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) would not entail mixing. Some narrations indicate that women were only permitted to emerge for Ṣalāh in the night (i.e. for Fajr and ‘Ishā’). (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 865; Fatḥ al-Bārī, 3:109-10) ‘Ᾱ’ishah (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhā) said: “The Messenger of Allāh (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) would pray Fajr, and women from the believers would attend with him wrapped up in their cloaks, and then they would return to their houses while no-one recognised them.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 372; Fatḥ al-Bārī, 2:89) Note, these women would return immediately after the Ṣalāh and were not recognised by anyone.

Measures were taken for men and women to not mix. Umm Salamah (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhā) said: “[The Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam)] would make salām, and the women would turn away and enter their houses before the Messenger of Allāh (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) [and the male companions] turned away.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 850; Fatḥ al-Bārī, 3:89) Al-Zuhrī, a narrator of this ḥadīth, explains: “This was so that the women turn back before the men catch up with them.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 875) Ibn Ḥajar comments that this ḥadīth shows “the reprehensibility of men mixing with women on the roads, let alone in homes.” (ibid. 3:92-3)

The Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) said: “The best rows of men are the first and the worst of them are the last, and the best rows of women are the last and worst of them the first.” (Saḥīḥ Muslim) Again, this is to show that men and women are to be separate from one another. One narration even indicates that there was a separate entrance for women in the time of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam). (Sunan Abī Dāwūd, 460; Badhl al-Majhūd, Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyyah, 3:186) Women’s emergence for ṣalāh was premised on such principles being adhered to. Once these principles were not maintained, and decadence became the norm amongst people, the ruling changed (see: darulmaarif.com/women-attending-the-masjid-a-clarification/).

Separate Sessions for Men and Women

Female companions complained to the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) that “the men have overpowered us with you, so arrange a day for us…” (Saḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 101) This shows men and women would not gather together in the same place – otherwise, there would be no reason the women could not attend with the men.

Segregation During Ṭawāf

A governor of Makkah from the early part of the second century of Hijrah, Muḥammad ibn Hishām, stopped women completely from making Ṭawāf when men were making Ṭawāf, i.e. they had completely separate times for making ṭawāf. (Fatḥ al-Bārī, 4:548-9) ‘Aṭā’ ibn Abī Rabāḥ (26 – 114), the great scholar of Makkah, questioned this, stating that the wives of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) made Ṭawāf when there were men present. His well-known student, Ibn Jurayj (80 – 150 H), at this, asked: “How was it that [women] were mixing with the men [in Ṭawāf]?” He said: “They would not mix, ‘Ᾱ’ishah would perform Ṭawāf screened from the men, not mixing with them.” (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, 1618) In other words, even in Ṭawāf, in the blessed era of the Salaf, men and women would keep separate from one another. Al-Fākihī (ca. 210 – 275 H) reports with his chain to Ibrāhīm al-Nakha‘ī: “‘Umar forbade men from making ṭawāf with women. He once saw a man making ṭawāf with the women and he struck him with a whip.” (Akhbār Makkah, Dār Khaḍir, 1:252)

The later intermingling that became commonplace in the Ḥaram was censured by the scholars. Mullā ‘Alī al-Qārī (ca. 930 – 1014 H) describes what “the women of Makkah do today, in terms of mixing with men in that area” as “a great abomination”. (al-Maslak al-Mutaqassiṭ, p79) Another great Makkan Ḥanafī scholar before him, Ibn al-Ḍiyā’ (789 – 853 H), writes in his detailed work on Ḥajj: “From the vilest of abominations is what the ignorant women amongst the commoners do during Ṭawāf, mixing with men together with their husbands while their faces remain uncovered.” (al-Baḥr al-‘Amīq, p1250) Ibn al-Ḍiyā’ has another work listing the ills that occurred in the Ḥaram, called Tanzīh al-Masjid al-Ḥarām ‘an Bida‘ al-Jahalat al-‘Awāmm. Amongst these ills, he mentions women coming into the Maṭāf and the Masjid on auspicious nights and mixing with men. (ibid. p34) A similar complaint was made even before by the Shāfi‘ī imām, al-‘Izz ibn Jamā‘ah (694 – 767 H), who added: “We ask Allāh to inspire the ruler to eradicate these abominations.” (Hidāyat al-Sālik, p1022-3; al-Fatāwā al-Kubrā al-Fiqhiyyah, 1:201-2)

Avoiding Intermingling on the Roads

Ibn Ḥibbān narrates in his Ṣaḥīḥ that the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam) said: “Women do not have the middle of the path.” Ibn Ḥibbān explains that when a woman comes out for a need, she should not walk in the middle of the path. This is because men walk in the middle, and doing so may result in men and women coming in very close proximity to one another. (Ṣaḥīh Ibn Ḥibbān, 5601) This is the teaching of Islām in the case of the road, so it would be even more emphasised in the case of closed environments.

Women Taught Behind Screens

‘Ᾱ’ishah (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhā), perhaps the greatest female teacher amongst the ṣaḥābah, would teach from behind a screen (ḥijāb/sitr) as mentioned in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim. Aḥmad ibn Hanbal narrated that a group of students of ḥadīth came to the great muḥaddith, Abu l-Ashhab (70 – 165 H), and did not know which ḥadīth to ask of him, until his daughter informed them from behind a screen of a ḥadith to learn from him. (Musnad Aḥmad, 33:401) From the blessed time of the Salaf, immense care would be taken to avoid intermingling – and this was despite the fact that their hearts were infinitely purer than ours. The Qur’ān says that if men (i.e. the male ṣaḥābah) are to ask something of the wives of the Prophet (ṣallallāhu ‘alayhi wasallam), they are to do so “from behind a screen” because “that is purer for your hearts and their hearts”. (Qur’ān, 33:53) If the purest of hearts, that of the male companions and the wives of the Prophet, are affected by such interactions, people after them are in far greater need of such measures.

Not Intermingling at the Funeral Procession

According to a group of the imāms, it is recommended to stand behind the bier as it is being carried to its burial place. However, al-Ṭaḥāwī recorded from ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhu) and his student, al-Aswad ibn Yazīd, that they would at times walk in front of the bier because women were following it from behind. This was done in order to avoid mixing with them. (Sharḥ Ma‘ānī al-Ᾱthār, 1:485) Al-Ṭaḥāwī says: “[The students of Ibn Mas‘ūd] would discourage [walking in front of the bier] and then would do it for an excuse, as that is better than mixing with women when they are close to the bier.” (ibid.) Badr al-Dīn al-‘Aynī al-Ḥanafī adds in his commentary: “because mixing (mukhālaṭah) with non-related women is ḥarām, while going ahead of the bier is permissible.” (Nukhab al-Afkār, 7:268)

Shāfi‘ī Imāms Forbidding Intermingling

Abū ‘Abdillāh al-Ḥalīmī (338 – 403 H), one of the major early Shāfi‘ī mujtahids, said: “Allāh says: ‘O you who believe, protect yourselves and your families from the Fire.’ Included in the totality of this is that a man protects his wife and daughter from mixing with men and conversing with them and being alone with them.” (al-Minhāj fī Shu‘ab al-Imān, 3:398)

Al-Māwardī (364 – 450 H), another major early Shāfi‘ī authority, said: “A woman is forbidden from mixing with men and is ordered to stay in the house [when there is no need to come out].” (al-Ḥāwi al-Kabīr, 2:51) Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (393 – 476 H), another major Shāfi‘ī authority, states: “[Jumu‘ah] is not obligatory on a woman because of what Jābir (raḍiyallāhu ‘anhu) narrated…and because she may mix with men and that is ḥarām.” (al-Muhadhdhab, Dār al-Qalam, 1:358)

Imām al-Ghazālī (450 – 505 H) said: “When the speaker is a non-elderly man (shābb), attractive to women in dress and appearance, with plenty of poems, gestures and movements, and women attend his gathering, this is an abomination (munkar) which must be prevented, since the corruption in this is greater than the benefit…It is obligatory to erect a screen/barrier between men and women that prevents seeing [one another], as that is also an anticipated cause of corruption. Norms bear testimony to these abominations.” (Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn, Dār al-Minhāj, 4:639) Note, al-Ghazālī wrote this more than nine-hundred years ago.

Imām Mālik on a Woman Eating with her Husband’s Friends

Some refer to the statement of Imām Mālik in his Muwaṭṭa’ on a woman eating with her husband or brother along with their male companions who are unrelated to her. However, an early Mālikī authority from ‘Irāq, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Jahm (d. 329 H), explains that Imām Mālik is here referring to an elderly woman (‘ajūz/mutajāllah). (al-Jāmi‘ fi l-Sunan wa l-Ᾱdāb wa l-Maghāzī wa l-Tārīkh, 214)

This is consistent with Imām Mālik’s other remarks, as he clearly opposes intermingling and makes distinctions between elderly and non-elderly women. It is narrated in the ‘Utbiyyah that Imām Mālik said: “I believe the ruler is to head towards workers on account of women sitting with them, and I believe he is not to leave a non-elderly woman sitting by these workers; as for an elderly woman and a lowly slave, who would not be suspect for sitting, and nor would the one sitting next to her be suspect, I see no problem with that.” (al-Nawādir wa l-Ziyādāt, 8:243; al-Bayān wa l-Taḥṣīl, 9:335) Ibn Rushd al-Mālikī (450 – 520 H) comments on this passage from al-‘Utbiyyah: “Indeed the Messenger of Allāh (Allāh bless him and grant him peace) said: ‘I did not leave a temptation more harmful for men than women,’ and he said: ‘Create distance between the persons of men and women.’” (ibid. 9:336) Furthermore, Imām Mālik states, as reported in the Muwaṭṭa’, that a man may give salām to an elderly woman, but not to a non-elderly woman.

Imām Abū Ḥanīfah Forbids Women from Attending the Masjids

Imām Abū Ḥanīfah and his students did not allow non-elderly women emerging for Ṣalāh (al-Aṣl, 1:365), let alone another activity not sanctioned in Sharī‘ah and not based on genuine need. The reason for this is to prevent men and women interacting or being tempted by one another to engage in the impermissible (e.g. looking with desire, speaking unnecessarily, touching etc.).

Ikhtilāṭ Vs Khalwah

Some people argue that since mixing is not khalwah (being in solitude with a woman), it is not a sin. But khalwah is a separate, graver, sin, while mixing and intermingling is also a sin, though of a lesser category. The fact that intermingling does not necessarily entail khalwah does not mean it is not sinful.

Conclusion: Statement of Ibn al-Ḥājj

In short, it is not permissible for non-elderly men and women to remain unnecessarily in a place where each gender is not designated their own separate area/space. Difficulties encountered in adhering to this principle does not negate its importance. Those engaged in this sin should try to eliminate it from their lives, or at minimum reduce it as far as possible, and constantly turn to Allāh in tawbah and ask Him to make for them a means to leave it completely. The corruption in the present time and the prevalence of such immoral practices and attitudes does not justify becoming lax or complacent about these matters. Rather, because of this prevalence, it would be a greater necessity to draw attention to its prohibition.

In this respect, I end with this fitting quote from the great Mālikī imām, Ibn al-Ḥājj (ca. 657 – 737 H), who lived more than seven-hundred years ago:
Note: Circumstances and situations which arise in the land of non-Muslims, or in lands that have adopted non-Muslim norms, that are beyond our control, and which might temporarily constrain us to enter into environments of free-mixing to fulfil a genuine personal need (ḥājah), cannot justify introducing such an abomination in places under our control (like private residences or masjids) or entering such places without need. “Need” here refers to something that to avoid would cause unbearable distress and hardship to individuals (Asbāb al-‘Udūl, p261). For example, to not go into the market to purchase basic necessities would undoubtedly cause unbearable distress. There is no ḥājah for introducing free-mixing within homes/masjids/madrasahs, or to enter places where it is taking place without any need.

In a recent diatribe, Nahiem Ajmal (“Mufti” Abu Layth al-Maliki) alleged that Hakim al-Ummah Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi (d. 1943/1362), may Allah have mercy on him, married a 10 year old girl, referring to it as the “rape of an innocent underaged girl” and “forcing himself on her.” Ajmal, a former school-teacher, claimed that this “pulling an underaged girl” was committed on the back of a student’s dream in which the Umm al-Mu’minin A’ishah (may Allah be pleased with her) was seen coming to Mawlana Thanawi’s house. Ajmal asserts that people will never condemn Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi because he is one of their founding fathers, and that they misuse the name of the Prophet (ﷺ) to find justification for their “darkened, sickened kind of desire.”

Ajmal cites Muhammad Ali Mirza

Ajmal’s claims hinge on exactly the same claim made by Muhammad Ali Mirza, an engineer based in Pakistan who has turned preacher. In a recent programme, Ajmal played a clip in which Mirza is seen speaking in Urdu while he himself summarises what is being said in English for his audience. This is where Ajmal stumbles and it becomes evident that he had failed to do his homework properly when borrowing Mirza’s arguments. What is even more interesting is that Mirza emphatically affirms that Umm al-Mu’minin A’ishah (may Allah be pleased with her) was married at a “very young age (bilkul choti umar) of 9.” Mirza also says that the attempt to present her age at the time of her marriage as 19 instead of 9 to appease non-Muslims is a pointless effort. In simple words, to allege “child rape” against Mawlana Thanawi, Ajmal uses the supposed research of an individual who entertains the very same notion regarding the Prophet (ﷺ), which Ajmal believes is “God damn disgusting” and “throwing the Prophet under the bus.”

It would have boded well for Ajmal if he had verified Mirza’s claims prior to repeating them. To the niche audience he caters for, that is of no concern. However, for people of sound disposition, it is highly insulting to be fed lies.

Mawlana Thanawi on Child Marriages

Considering that Mawlana Thanawi is alleged to have boasted about “pulling an underaged girl”, it is pertinent to present his stance on child marriages from his own works.

In Bahishti Zewar, the hyperfocus of Ajmal’s claims, Mawlana Thanawi states:
In Islah-i-Inqilab-i-Ummat, Mawlana Thanawi writes:
He further writes:

Did Mawlana Thanawi marry a 10-year-old?

Nahiem Ajmal claims: “He [Mawlana Thanawi] mentions it in his magazine. I married an underaged girl, underaged girl [sic]. I think she was about 10. He marries like a 10 year old.”

On closer inspection, Ajmal’s outright dishonesty becomes very evident. In fact, he outshines Mirza’s dishonesty on this instance. Mirza, whose allegations Ajmal regurgitates, did not actually touch on the age of Mawlana Thanawi’s wife, Muniba Khatun, may Allah have mercy on her, at the time of their marriage. It is Ajmal, however, who alleged that she was ten – something that he has repeated several times since.

What is clearly established is that Muniba Khatun was either 18 or 19 when she married Mawlana Thanawi, not ten. The background to her marriage is that she was one of the two daughters of Pir Ji Zafar Ahmad, may Allah have mercy on him, a close associate of Mawlana Thanawi. Muniba Khatun was originally married to Mawlana Thanawi’s nephew and distinguished student, Mawlana Sa’id Ahmad Thanawi, may Allah have mercy on him. Her sister was married to Mawlana Sa’id’s younger brother, Mawlana Zafar Ahmad Thanawi, may Allah have mercy on him, the renowned author of I’la al-Sunan among other works. Both marriages were arranged by Mawlana Thanawi.

However, Mawlana Sa’id Ahmad Thanawi passed away during a pandemic in 1330 AH (1911/1912), a mere six months after his marriage, leaving behind an expecting widow. A few months later, his widow gave birth to a daughter, whom Mawlana Thanawi named Rashida Khatun, may Allah have mercy on her.[4]

Mawlana Dr Khalil Ahmad Thanawi, the grandson of Muniba Khatun, writes:
The exact date of this marriage is recorded in the Al-Imdad periodical (Safar 1335 AH / November-December 1916), wherein Mawlana Thanawi detailed the circumstances behind his second marriage, as well as some of the difficulties and objections he subsequently encountered. These details were written in response to a letter he had received querying his second marriage, and were then incorporated into his work Islah-i-Inqilab-i-Ummat.

Mawlana Thanawi states that his marriage to Muniba Khatun was in Ramadan 1334 AH.[7] Through a simple calculation, it is evident that Muniba Khatun, widowed in 1330 AH at the age of 14 or 15, was at least 18 at the time of her marriage to Mawlana Thanawi.

Dream regarding Umm al-Mu’minin A’ishah (may Allah be pleased with her)

Mawlana Thanawi had initially contemplated marrying a second time. Pir Ji Zafar Ahmad had already made the proposal for Muniba Khatun, as mentioned above. However, due to a number of considerations, Mawlana Thanawi felt it was not in anyone’s best interests and thus decided against it.[8]

Mawlana Thanawi writes:
When Mawlana Thanawi himself said that he did not pay much attention to this, the calumnious manner in which Ajmal frames this as “misconstruing people’s dreams” and “I am going to pull an underaged girl” becomes self-evident.

Casting malicious aspersions on others, whether living or dead, is Nahiem Ajmal’s forte. Hence his slander against Mawlana Thanawi, may Allah have mercy on him, is not at all surprising or out of character for him. Despite having his heterodox opinions thoroughly debunked over the years (like here and here), Ajmal relentlessly continues to project falsities without fear of scrutiny. Suffice it to say that no sensible person would take their religion from an individual for whom academic integrity is not even a priority.

Muhammad ibn Sirin, Allah have mercy on him, famously said, “This knowledge is religion so consider who you take your religion from.”[10]

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References

[1] Bahishti Zewar, part 9, pg 447.

[2] Islah-i-Inqilab-i-Ummat, vol 2, pg 24-25.

[3] Islah-i-Inqilab-i-Ummat, vol 2, pg 43-44.

[4] ‘Aks-i-Jamil, pg 140; Karwan-i-Thanawi, pg 247, Tadhkirat al-Zafar, pg 55.

[5] A reference to the fact that he had given permission to Mawlana Thanawi to marry his daughters where he felt appropriate.

[6] ‘Aks-i-Jamil (Biography of Mufti Jamil Ahmad Thanawi), pg 140.

[7] Al-Imdad (Safar 1335 AH), pg 14; Islah-i-Inqilab-i-Ummat, Vol 2, pg 88.

[8] Islah-i-Inqilab-i-Ummat, Vol 2, pg 86-87.

[9] Al-Imdad (Safar 1335 AH), pg 13; Islah-i-Inqilab-i-Ummat, Vol 2, pg 87.

[10] Sahih Muslim, 26

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Taken from HERE

Introduction

Asrar Rashid of Birmingham, UK, is a preacher who claims to be non-partisan, non-sectarian, and an objective, unbiased “Sunnī Muslim”. However, the subjectivity, and often baselessness, of his claims on the nature and roots of one of the most pronounced intra-Sunnī divides in the Indian Subcontinent proves otherwise. His entire thesis on the causes of the divide is coloured by highly subjective, sometimes evidently false, sectarian readings of history.

In the following, we will deconstruct his historical narrative from a recent talk[1] which has been uploaded online. Relevant parts of the talk will be transcribed and responded to in some detail. Asrar Rashid provides his account in a roughly chronological order. Thus, the following will document (and transcribe) the substantive points in his account and demonstrate the clear bias, subjectivity, lack of academic rigour, and at times outright falsity, of his claims, exposing the fact that they are tainted by sectarian allegiances and tropes, and are not based on an objective assessment of the evidence. In the course of the response, we also hope readers will gain a better appreciation of some of the oft-discussed issues that Asrar Rashid touches upon.

Sectarian bias will often cloud a person’s judgement. If, for example, sectarian mythology is rooted in the idea that Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd wrote Taqwiyat al-Īmān after having come under the direct influence of Arabian Wahhābīs, it will be difficult to entertain the possibility (in this case, the fact) that Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd wrote Taqwiyat al-Īmān years before setting foot in the Ḥijāz, that is, before even the remotest contact with the Arabian Wahhābīs. In deconstructing Asrar Rashid’s narrative, we will observe several other such examples of conclusions that are clearly products of a biased reading.

In constructing this biased narrative, Asrar Rashid also resorts to some clearly false claims, like the claim that ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī was hung by the British (while in reality he died a natural death at the Andaman Islands), or that Nuzhat al-Khawāṭir reports that ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī only revolted against the British because they stopped paying him (whereas nothing of the sort is mentioned in Nuzhat al-Khawāṭir).

In short, the response will challenge Asrar Rashid’s claims to objectivity. If he really is objective and sincere, as he claims, will he reassess the claims he has made, some of which are patently false, in light of the evidence that will be cited below? Will he answer the challenges that will be put to him below in an objective manner? Or will he regurgitate the standard claims and dismiss the evidence in favour of sectarian (mis)readings of history (and thus proving he is only shedding the label of sectarianism and not its reality)?

Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd and Taqwiyat al-Īmān

Asrar Rashid says:
Mawlānā Nūr al-Ḥasan Kāndhlawī has written a thorough study on Taqwiyat al-Īmān.[2] Most of the discussion on Taqwiyat al-Īmān below will, therefore, be based on his research.

Taqwiyat al-Īmān was written some time in, or before, the year 1818.[3] We know this because the oldest available manuscript dates to 1818, preserved in Madrasa Ṣawlatiyya at Makkah.[4] Taqwiyat al-Īmān was first published (i.e. printed) in 1826 or 1827 at the Maṭba‘ah Aḥmadī run by Sayyid ‘Abdullāh ibn Sayyid Bahādur ‘Alī.[5] Maṭba‘ah Aḥmadī was also the first to publish al-Fawz al-Kabīr by Shāh Waliyyullāh, Mūḍiḥ al-Qurān by Shāh ‘Abd al-Qādir and other works of the Waliyyullāh family.[6] Asrar Rashid should therefore identify his source for the claim that Taqwiyat al-Īmān was first released in 1821.

It appears the claim, not surprisingly, may be the product of sectarian narrative bias, according to which, Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd (1779 – 1831) came under the influence of Wahhābī preachers when he visited the Ḥijāz, and Taqwiyat al-Īmān was a product of direct Wahhābī influence. More about this “contact theory” will be mentioned later. Since Shāh Ismā‘īl left for Ḥajj in 1821, it appears the claim is being made that Taqwiyat al-Īmān was released in the same year. But there are several problems with this theory. Firstly, there is clear evidence that Taqwiyat al-Īmān was written at the latest in 1818, several years before the Ḥajj. Secondly, Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd arrived at Ḥijāz in 1822, not 1821.[7] Thirdly, Taqwiyat al-Īmān is based on an earlier work of Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd in Arabic, called Radd al-Ishrāk, which was one of his earliest works written around the year 1798.[8]

In brief, Taqwiyat al-Īmān was written several years before the Ḥajj journey of 1821 (and was first published some years after the Ḥajj journey). If Asrar Rashid is objective, will he concede the point that Taqwiyat al-Īmān was written before the Ḥajj journey, before the remotest contact with the Arabian Wahhābīs?

Did the British Royal Asiatic Society Print and Distribute Taqwiyat al-Īmān?

On the subject of Taqwiyat al-Īmān, Asrar Rashid mentions in a related talk[9]:
The “fact” Asrar Rashid refers to is a myth that was created some time during the latter half of the twentieth century. Refuting this myth, Mawlānā Nūr al-Ḥasan Kāndhlawī mentions: “Taqwiyat al-Īmān was never published by the Asiatic Society, neither before its publication at Maṭba‘ Aḥmadī nor after. I have a copy of an old index of the Asiatic Society’s publications printed in January 1833. The index lists all the Arabic, Persian and Urdu publications of Asiatic Society up to that date, but there is no sign of Taqwiyat al-Īmān there. Furthermore, the available books printed by the Asiatic Society, and its published articles, that I have seen do not include Taqwiyat al-Īmān.”[10] Mawlānā Nūr al-Ḥasan shows that the claim that the British published and distributed Taqwiyat al-Īmān comes about a century and a half after the events.

He mentions that the only truth to this allegation is that the Royal Asiatic Society published an article by Mir Shahamat Ali that included an English translation of Taqwiyat al-Īmān. This was published as part of their journal, most likely some time in the 1850s.

If Asrar Rashid is objective, will he accept that there is no reliable evidence for his claim that the British printed an Urdu edition of Taqwiyat al-Īmān and distributed it in India?

Shāh Ismā‘īl’s Alleged Links with the Arabian Wahhābīs

Asrar Rashid further says:
Asrar Rashid also claims that Shāh Ismā‘īl’s uncles and forefathers were “Sunnīs”, but that “he was against the methodology of his forefathers”.

Both the claims that Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd came under direct influence of the Arabian Wahhābīs and that he was against the methodology of his forefathers are completely baseless.

The alleged links with the Arabian Wahhābīs suffer from the following problems.

Firstly, as stated, there is no evidence. Harlan O. Pearson a (neutral) academic researcher on Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd’s movement states while discussing Shāh Ismā‘īl and the group’s pilgrimage:
Secondly, when Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd, together with a large cohort, arrived at Arabia, Wahhābīs had already been defeated and had been expelled from the Ḥijāz, and thus held no influence there. Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī explains:
Would Asrar Rashid accept that there is no objective historical evidence to support his “contact theory”?

Detailed accounts are available of the Ḥajj journey[15], including that Shāh Ismā‘īl taught Ḥujjatullāh al-Bālighah (the celebrated work of his grandfather) while at the Ḥijāz, that the Ṣūfī tract Ṣirāṭ e Mustaqīm was translated to Arabic, and that many pledged their allegiance to Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd (1786 – 1831), and so on, but nothing about coming into contact with Wahhābī preachers.

Thirdly, as explained earlier, Asrar Rashid believes Taqwiyat al-Īmān was written after his conversion to Wahhābī belief. But as explained earlier, a simple chronology disproves this. Radd al-Ishrāk and its derivative work, Taqwiyat al-Īmān, were both written years before the Ḥajj.

Differences between Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd and Wahhābīs

Fourthly, there are important differences between the ideologies of Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd and the Wahhābīs. In Taqwiyat al-Īmān, which was supposedly written under Wahhābī influence, Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd wrote: “Yes, if ‘O Allāh give me something by means of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qādir’ is said, that is fine.”[16] In other words, he permits Tawassul through personalities, which Wahhābīs do not.

In another work written in Arabic called ‘Abaqāt[17], on the topic of Ṣufī metaphysics, Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd includes the Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs amongst those on the truth, as well as those who subscribe to the different Ṭarīqas of the Ṣūfīs.

He states:
Thus, Shāh Ismā‘īl explicitly states his allegiance to Sunnī schools of ‘aqīdah, in contrast to Wahhābīs. Will Asrar Rashid acknowledge this?

It is not certain when ‘Abaqāt was written. In a later work called Yak Rozah (written in 1826), when constructing his arguments against ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī, Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd references the beliefs of the Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs, in particular their differences on the topic of “Takwīn”.[19] This demonstrates that even after his Ḥajj journey, he did not abandon his affiliation to these two schools. Will Asrar Rashid accept that this would be uncharacteristic of a true “Wahhābī”?

There is no evidence therefore that Shāh Ismā‘īl abandoned the methodology of his forefathers. In ‘Abaqāt, he declares that his major source of learning is from his uncles,[20] and the work ‘Abaqāt derives from the teachings of his grandfather.[21] Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān (1832 – 1890) writes about Shāh Ismā‘īl: “He followed the footsteps of his grandfather in word and deed both, and completed what his grandfather started, and fulfilled what was obligatory on him, and what is for him remains…He wasn’t one to invent a new methodology in Islām as the ignorant claim.”[22]

Some may assume that Shāh Ismā‘īl’s emphasis on eradicating idolatrous practices suggests foreign influence. But, in fact, even such teaching can be traced to the writings of Shāh Waliyyullāh.[23] Moreover, Shāh Ismā‘īl’s conception of shirk is not the same as Wahhābīs, more on which will be written below.

“The Wahhābī Creed”

Asrar Rashid continues:
Asrar Rashid identifies two areas of “Wahhābī heresy”, one anthropomorphism and the other removing a connection with the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). Some have alleged that Shāh Ismā‘īl promoted anthropomorphism, but this is an unsubstantiated claim[24] and contradicts his explicit statements found in ‘Abaqāt. [25]

Moreover, Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd did not remove any connection with the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). He wrote a eulogy of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) called Mathnawī Silk-e-Nūr. Part of the eulogy states: “Although outwardly that pure body is hidden from these eyes beneath the earth, still, its light stands in its place, as there is a place for it in every sound heart.”[26]

Moreover, as Mawlānā Madanī states:
Thus, the idea that Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd removed the Prophet’s (peace and blessings be upon him) connection with the Ummah is unfounded.

Shāh Ismā‘īl and Shirk

Strangely, Asrar Rashid omitted to mention Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd’s alleged adoption of flawed Wahhābī conceptions of shirk. In Wahhābī belief, certain actions like slaughtering an animal while taking an individual’s name or calling out for help from a dead saint are deemed to be major shirk that expel a person from Islām, irrespective of the person’s intentions or beliefs. [28] The difference between Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd and Wahhābīs on this point will be explained in a little more detail, as in the mind of many of Shāh Ismā‘īl’s detractors this is the clearest evidence of a connection between his ideology and that of Wahhābīs.

While Shāh Ismā‘īl condemns idolatrous practices, the people he targets are those who believe saints have extraordinary powers in which, like Allāh, they operate above created means (asbāb) and are free-acting. He describes the kind of shirk he is addressing in Radd al-Ishrāk, from which Taqwiyat al-Īmān derives.

He states in Radd al-Ishrāk:
Shāh Ismā‘īl goes onto mention some actions which are derived from these beliefs. Shirk, in his understanding, is fundamentally a mistaken belief, not something based merely on a person’s actions. Actions, however, can be manifestations of shirk, but these do not necessarily take a person out of Islām. ‘Uthmān Nābulūsī, a student of Sa‘īd Fūda in Jordan, and author of a work refuting mistaken Wahhābī conceptions on “Tawḥīd”, commented after reading Shāh Ismā‘il’s introduction to the above work (Radd al-Ishrāk): “This introduction is completely unproblematic, and there is a massive difference between what he said and what Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb said.”[30]

The shirk that Shāh Ismā‘īl is refuting is similar to what Shāh Waliyyullāh described as the belief of the idolaters, that is, a belief in Allāh being in need of subordinate deities who function as His agents in controlling certain affairs.[31] Towards the beginning of Taqwiyat al-Īmān itself, Shāh Ismā‘īl explains that this is the shirk he is refuting. While describing the people he is refuting, he states:
As can be seen, Shāh Ismā‘īl is addressing a specific type of belief amongst some of the ignorant Muslims of India, which amounts to major shirk, and is akin to the idolatrous beliefs of the pagan Arabs the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) fought. In his condemnation of shirk, Shāh Ismā‘īl does describe certain acts as “shirk”, but he did not necessarily believe these to amount to major shirk on their own.[33]

A fatwā of Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd is reproduced in the Fatāwā of Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Ganohī clarifying this:
In brief, the specific belief that Shāh Ismā‘īl regarded to be true shirk is to believe that someone apart from Allāh has independent powers. Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī al-Thānawī explains this idolatrous belief as follows:
Finally, it should be noted that there was a forged copy of Radd al-Ishrāk attributed to Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd in which the text is altered to make it appear to be a summary of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. The forgery has misled some to believe that Radd al-Ishrāk derives from Kitāb al-Tawḥīd. Mawlānā Nūr al-Ḥasan Kāndhlawī discusses the forgery in his study on Taqwiyat al-Īmān.[36]

Taqwiyat al-Īmān did certainly contain harsh language as acknowledged by the scholars of Deoband like Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī[37], Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī Thānawī[38] and Mawlānā Anwar Shāh Kashmīrī[39]. The latter even said, “It contained harshness that lessened its benefit”[40], but Mawlānā Thānawī points out that the firm words were used as treatment for the prevailing ignorance of that era.[41]

Historical Narrative: Reconstructing Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd as a Violent Religious Zealot

Asrar Rashid moves onto reconstructing a historical narrative that portrays Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd as a violent extremist and his theological opponent, ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī, as a brave upholder of armed struggle. He states:
This is an entirely false narrative. Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd did not go to Balakot to “preach Tawḥīd” or to “fight the British”. In 1826, a couple of years after the Ḥajj, Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd had started a campaign of Jihād against the Sikhs (whose capital was in Lahore). He travelled to Afghanistan and north-west India to gather support from tribal chiefs. After pushing back some Sikh attacks, he gained the trust and respect of tribal chiefs, who handed over leadership to him. Eventually, he was declared amīr of Peshawar and surrounding areas, and Sharī‘ah was enforced under his command. In 1831, he decided to go to Kashmir to set up a base there to continue the Jihād against the Sikhs. Balakot was en route to Kashmir, and a place where the Muslim fighters felt they could carry out other related activities. However, while at Balakot some Muslims betrayed Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd and his army, and guided the Sikhs to their whereabouts. A battle ensued, and Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd and Ismā‘īl Shahīd were martyred at the hands of the Sikhs.[42]

It is Asrar Rashid’s sectarian bias that does not allow him to see this movement as a sincere effort to end Sikh brutality against Muslims and restore Islām to those lands. Through a sectarian lens, he is forced to view Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd as a “Wahhābī”, and thus reinterpret his military activities in light of those of the Arabian Wahhābīs.

Debates Between ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī and Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd

Continuing his historical account, Asrar Rashid says:
ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī (1797 – 1861), about whom more will be written below, wrote a brief refutation of Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd in 1826, to which the latter wrote a response called Yak Rozah. The debate occurred in response to a sentence of Taqwiyat al-Īmān. Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd was discussing a mistaken conception of shafā‘ah (intercession), called “shafā‘ah al-wajāhah” (intercession of status), in which it is believed that Allāh suppresses His original intent to punish one deserving of punishment because someone holding a high status intercedes, and He does not wish to cause disruption in His Kingdom on account of displeasing the intercessor. As Shāh Ismā‘īl explains, one who holds such a belief is a “true mushrik and a complete ignoramus, and has not understood the meaning of divinity in the slightest, and has not realised the greatness of this Owner of the Kingdom.”[43] Then, explaining the power and greatness of Allāh, he said: “It is the nature of this King of Kings that in a single moment, had He so wished with one command of ‘Kun’, He would create thousands of prophets, saints, jinn and angels equal to Jibra’īl, upon him peace, and Muḥammad, Allāh bless him and grant him peace; and would turn the whole universe from the throne to the earth upside down and put another creation in its place.”[44] He goes onto say that if all creatures were like Jibra’īl and the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him), this would not increase in the lustre of Allāh’s kingdom, and similarly if all creatures were devils and dajjals this would not decrease from the lustre of His Kingdom.[45]

In context, Shāh Ismā‘īl’s statement is justifiable, given that he was trying to drive home the point to readers (who would entertain the belief in “shafā‘ah al-wajāhah”) that Allāh has no need for His creation and does not depend on them in the slightest. But ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Haqq Khayrābādī picked up on a technical point, claiming that it is intrinsically impossible for there to be an equal (mithl/naẓīr) to Muḥammad (peace and blessings be upon him), so the scenario Shāh Ismā‘īl presented was not even hypothetically possible.

In Yak Roza, Shāh Ismā‘īl wrote a response. He explains that for an equal to come into existence is included within Divine Power but its materialisation is impossible. He presents evidence from the Qur’ān and from reason. From the Qur’ān, he cites the verse: “Is not He Who created the heavens and the earth capable of creating the like of them [i.e. human beings]? Of course!” (36:81) This verse shows Allāh can create an equal or a like of each human being, which of course includes the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him).[46]

From a rational point of view, if ever something is mumkin (intrinsically possible), then its equal is also intrinsically possible. In terms of the basic nature (māhiya) of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) and his characteristics of perfection, there is no intrinsic impossibility of a likeness or equal being created.[47]

Shāh Ismā‘īl also offers several responses to the point that the Prophet is “Khātam al-Nabiyyīn”, and thus cannot have an equal. One response he offers is that it is in Allāh’s power to create a realm of existence that is not linearly connected in time with this realm, where the equal will also be a final prophet. Thus, it is not beyond the realm of conceivability and thus possibility that an equal of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) could be created. Thus, it is intrinsically possible though extrinsically impossible.[48]

It is not the case, as Asrar Rashid tries to make out, that the scholars in general refuted Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd. A close friend of ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī, Muftī Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dehlawī (1790 – 1868) [who was a teacher of Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī], rivalled ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Haqq in his expertise of the rational sciences, having studied with Mawlānā Faḍl al-Imām Khayrābādī (ꜥAllāmah Fadl al-Ḥaqq’s father) also. He approved of Taqwiyat al-Īmān[49] and disapproved of ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq’s refutations, as reported by one of his students, Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān (1832 – 1890).[50]

Later, ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī wrote a more detailed refutation called Taḥqīq al-Fatwā. Sayyid Ḥaydar ‘Alī Tonkī (1788 – 1856), an expert in philosophy and logic, refuted it in a work called al-Kalām al-Fāḍil al-Kabīr ‘alā Ahl al-Takfīr.[51] Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān comments: “The reality is that the truth in these debates are in the hand of Sayyid [Ḥaydar ‘Alī Tonkī], not Shaykh [Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī], as evident to one who refers to their books with objectivity, and I have seen most of them.”[52]

A non-partisan scholar from a slightly later era, Pīr Mehr ‘Alī Shāh (1859 – 1937), was asked about this debate. Before offering his opinion, he said:

Was there a Verbal Debate Between ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī and Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd?

Asrar Rashid goes onto say:
Mawlānā Nur al-Ḥasan Kāndhlawī shows that this too is a myth. ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī and Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd only engaged in a written debate, not a verbal one. ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī first wrote a response in 1826, after Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd had already left Delhi for Jihād against the Sikhs. They did not debate before this.[54]

Historical Narrative: Reconstructing ‘Allāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī as an Anti-British Revolutionary

Asrar Rashid continues:
This entire account is very problematic. To start with, ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī died a natural death after being imprisoned on the Andaman Islands. He was not hanged. Siddīq Hasan Khān, who was a contemporary of ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī and saw him, says simply that “he died” on the island.[55] Other biographies mention the same. Can Asrar Rashid prove that ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī was executed by the British and not just imprisoned on the island?

The assertion that Nuzhat al-Khawāṭir reports that ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī revolted against the British because of not being given payment also seems to be outright fabrication. One can read through the short biography of ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī in Nuzhat al-Khawāṭir, and find nothing of the sort.[56] In fact, Nuzhat al-Khawāṭir doesn’t even say he revolted against the British! It just says “he was accused of rebelling against the English government…”[57] This description – that his involvement in the rebellion was merely an unproven allegation – seems to be more accurate.

The contemporary German professor, Jamal Malik, has written a reliable sketch of the life of ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī, pieced together from the latter’s letters, notes and unpublished books.[58] ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī was an employee of the British whom he served from around 1815. He, however, was not fond of the arrogance and rudeness of the British. Thus, in 1831, he quit his service. But just before the outbreak in 1857, he resumed his service, and served in a high British administrative position in Lucknow.

On his alleged involvement in the 1857 rebellion, Jamal Malik says: “Apart from the claims of his followers, there is no definitive evidence about the extent of Khairabadi’s alleged involvement in subversive activities, and no such claims could be supported on the basis of the available material, i.e., letters, poems, autobiographical accounts.”[59]

A fatwā was drafted in Delhi and signed by some prominent scholars (possibly, under threat or coercion), including Muftī Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Dehlawī (who was mentioned earlier). The fatwā supported revolting against the British if they kill Muslims and appropriate their wealth. At the time the fatwā was signed, ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī was not even in Delhi. So, it appears he did not sign the fatwā.

One of the leaders of the rebellion of 1857 was a Mīr Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Shahājānpūrī who shared the same name as ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī. Mistaking the latter for the former seems to have been the reason he was imprisoned. Descendants of ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī report that he appealed his sentence, and was even meant to be released, but died shortly before the release date.[60] Jamal Malik concludes: “Whether Fadl-e Haqq took active part in the revolt or not is still a matter of debate. In fact, his autobiographical notes and poems permit no such conclusion.”[61] He further says: “In the case of Khairabadi, one may suspect a judicial error on the part of the British administration. This is more likely, since there had been a namesake (Sayyid Fadl-e Haqq Shahjahanpuri) active in 1857. This error would provide evidence of the profound ignorance or even vindictiveness of the British.”[62]

Hence, Asrar Rashid’s attempt at rebranding ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī as a leading proponent of the 1857 revolution is of course a stretch. He was a fiery theologian and British employee, never proven to have rebelled. It is obvious the only reason ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī is rebranded in this way is to portray him in a positive light vis a vis his theological opponent Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd.

Māwlānā Qāsim Nānotwī

Asrar Rashid further says:
This account is either very misleading or downright falsehood. Asrar Rashid makes it appear that ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawi (1848 – 1886) wrote a refutation of Taḥdhīr al-Nās (and thus this should have been mentioned in his biography in Nuzhat al-Khawāṭir), while this is not the case.

The reality is that there was a debate between Māwlānā Qāsim Nānotwī (1833 – 1880) and Māwlānā Muḥammad Shāh Punjābī on the contents of Taḥdhīr al-Nās. The arguments of both sides were then presented to some ‘ulamā’, who favoured the view of Māwlānā Muḥammad Shāh Punjābī. This was then published as Ibṭāl Aghlāṭ Qāsimiyyah.

The disagreement was over the meaning of “Khātam al-Nabiyyīn”. The general understanding is it means simply “the last prophet”, but Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī believed it to have a broader meaning that includes the notion that prophethood culminates at the Prophet (peace and blessing be upon him), whereby his prophethood was granted directly by Allāh while the prophethood of all other Prophets was attained via the intermediary of his prophethood. This, he said, is the esoteric meaning (baṭn) of “Khātam al-Nabiyyīn”. He did not believe this to contradict chronological finality, and in fact considered chronological finality to be the accepted outward meaning (ẓahr) of “Khātam al-Nabiyyīn”, as well as part of the esoteric meaning either by extension or implication.[63] The signatories of Ibṭāl Aghlāṭ Qāsimiyyah considered Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī’s interpretation to be incorrect. ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawi was allegedly one of these signatories.

The real cause of sectarianism in this affair, however, was unjustified takfir. Takfīr on this subject was initiated by Naqī ‘Alī Khān (1830 – 1880), the father of Aḥmad Riḍā Khān Barelwī (1856 – 1921)[64], and then followed by Aḥmad Riḍā Khān himself. The latter claimed that Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī denied the finality of prophethood – which is a clear error. In the very work Taḥdhīr al-Nās, Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī declared belief in chronological finality as being from the absolute essentials of religion denying which is kufr. He writes:
Thus, even some scholars affiliated to Aḥmad Riḍā Khān (and who would not be partisan to Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwi) have also acknowledged that Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī does not deny the essential belief of Islām on the chronological finality of prophethood. One such eminent scholar, Pir Karam Shah Azhari (1918 – 1998), says:
Notice, he says “without doubt” Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī had certainty in the chronological finality of prophethood and that it is from the necessities of religion. This is in contrast to Aḥmad Riḍā Khān’s definitive verdict of kufr on Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī precisely for denying the chronological finality of prophethood.

Another prominent scholar from Pakistan unaffiliated with the school of Deoband, Khwājah Qamar al-Dīn Siyālwī (1906 – 1981), said:
In short, while Mawlānā Nānotwī offers a less common interpretation of the term “Khātam al-Nabiyyīn”, his interpretation does not violate any established belief of Islām, least of all the chronological finality of the prophethood of Muḥammad (peace and blessings be upon him) and that prophethood terminated at him. Even amongst those who are from the same school as Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī, some have conceded that there can be legitimate disagreement with him on this subject[68], but there is no grounds for takfīr. It should be noted that Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī, though in a minority, was not unprecedented in his view on the meaning of “Khātam al-Nabiyyīn”.[69]

The Seeds of Sectarianism

Asrar Rashid continues:
It is important to add that Aḥmad Riḍā Khān did not only “refute” these senior imāms, but made takfīr against them. The takfir of Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī was discussed briefly above. The three remaining takfīrs will be discussed in brief below.[70]

Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī

On Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī (1829 – 1905), Aḥmad Riḍā Khān Barelwī claimed that he wrote a fatwā in which he did not censure the view that lying has actually occurred in Allāh’s speech, and in fact lent support to it. Aḥmad Riḍā Khān states he has seen this alleged “fatwā” in the handwriting of Mawlānā Gangohī and with his seal. Moreover, he states that the fatwā along with its refutation has been published several times. The reality, however, is that this so-called “fatwā” was circulated only amongst detractors of Mawlānā Gangohī. It is not found in any of his published fatwās, nor is it recognised by any of his students.[71] In fact, in direct contradiction to this alleged “fatwā”, Mawlānā Gangohī explicitly said in his published Fatāwā that the one who believes an actual lie has occurred in Allāh’s speech, or that Allāh is characterised by “false speech”, is a kāfir.[72]

Mawlānā Gangohī himself was unaware of this allegation until the last moments of his life. In the year 1905, Mawlānā Gangohī’s student, Mawlānā Murtaḍā Ḥasan Chāndpūrī (1868 – 1951), became aware of this alleged “fatwā” and the claims being made. He immediately sent a copy to Mawlānā Gangohī and asked for clarification. Mawlānā Gangohī replied: “I had no knowledge of this. This allegation is…an error. Allāh forbid that I can say such!” Mawlānā Murtaḍā Ḥasan Chāndpūrī documents this in his Tazkiyat al-Khawāṭir.[73]

In short, the allegation against Mawlānā Gangohī is based on a fabricated fatwā that he himself denied, that is not known to his students and that contradicts his explicit fatwās.

Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī

On Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī (1852 – 1927), Aḥmad Riḍā Khān claimed that he wrote in Barāhīn Qāṭi‘ah that (Allāh forbid!) Shayṭān’s knowledge is superior to the Prophet’s. In Barāhīn Qāṭi‘ah, Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī was responding to another work, Anwār Saṭi‘ah. The author of the latter work apparently argues that since the Shayṭān is known to have extensive knowledge of people’s actions and so on, such knowledge should not be denied for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) given his greater status. Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī responds that knowledge of such things cannot be determined for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) based on analogies of this nature.[74]

As can be seen, the discussion is about a specific type of knowledge. This is absolutely clear from the context and from explicit passages of Barāhīn Qāṭi‘ah. Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī is not stating (as suggested by Aḥmad Riḍā Khān) that Shayṭān possesses greater knowledge than the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) in a general and absolute sense. But, in matters that are not the basis of excellence or virtue in knowledge, Shayṭān may be aware of certain aspects of them that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) was not aware of. For example, Shayṭān may be aware that a certain person has robbed a bank including the means and techniques by which he accomplished this, while this knowledge was not given to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him); this in no way means Shayṭān is superior in knowledge to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him).

As he clarifies in a later work called al-Muhannad, Mawlānā Khalīl Aḥmad Sahāranpūrī states that excellence in knowledge is based on greater knowledge of Allāh, His Dīn and the outer and inner aspects of Sharī‘ah. No one equals the rank of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) in such knowledge. In things that are not the basis of virtue or excellence in knowledge, however, there is nothing surprising in another knowing something that is unknown to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). [75]

Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī Thānawī

On Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī Thānawī (1863 – 1943), Aḥmad Riḍā Khān claimed that he wrote in his Ḥifẓ al-Īmān that (Allāh forbid!) madmen, children and animals possess knowledge of the unseen equal to that of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). This too is far from what Mawlānā Ashraf ‘Alī Thānawī actually said. In Ḥifẓ al-Īmān, he was discussing the question of using the title “‘Ᾱlim al-Ghayb” (knower of the unseen) for the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). He firstly explains that this is a technical term in Sharī‘ah which means a being that possesses knowledge of unseen realities without the need for any means or instrument. Such a characteristic is of course exclusive to Allāh, because everyone apart from Allāh acquires knowledge of unseen realities only via a means and instrument.

He then explains that “unseen” (ghayb) can refer to things that are hidden from the senses in a general sense, whether acquired by a means or not. But even with this interpretation, the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) should not be called “‘Ᾱlim al-Ghayb”. He reasons that the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) of course does not possess knowledge of all unseen realities, while the quality of possessing knowledge of some unseen realities is not exclusive to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him). Possessing knowledge of some unseen realities is something found in Zayd and ‘Amr, children, madmen and animals, because they all possess knowledge of some things hidden to others – does this now mean that they are all to be called “‘Ᾱlim al-Ghayb”?![76]

As can be seen, Mawlānā Thānawī does not state that “madmen, children and animals possess knowledge of the unseen equal to that of the Prophet” as was alleged. Rather, he simply states that they possessed knowledge of some unseen realities; and thus the mere possession of knowledge of some unseen realities is not exclusive to the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him).

When Mawlānā Thānawī was asked about the passage of Ḥifẓ al-Īmān and if he had ever written that “madmen, children and animals possess knowledge of the unseen equal to that of the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him)”, he replied: “I did not write this revolting content in any book. Let alone writing it, this thought never crossed my heart. Nor is it the necessary conclusion of any passage of mine, as I will explain later. Since I understand this content to be revolting…how can it be my intent? That person who believes this, or without belief utters it explicitly or implicitly, I believe this person to be outside the fold of Islam because he has denied decisive texts and lessened the Revered Joy and Pride of the World, the Prophet, Allah bless him and grant him peace.”[77]

Aḥmad Riḍā Khān nonetheless declared Mawlānā Thānawī a disbeliever on this account. In fact, he went as far as to say if anyone doubts the disbelief of these individuals, he is a disbeliever himself![78]

Testimony of Non-Partisan ‘Ulamā’

Those who do not have a stake in this conflict have also regarded the ‘ulamā’ of Deoband highly. One of the great spiritual masters of the era was Shaykh Faḍl al-Raḥmān Ganjmurādābādī (1794 – 1895) with whom several early scholars of Deoband were connected, including Muftī ‘Azīz al-Raḥmān Deobandī (1859 – 1928), Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madanī and Mawlānā Murtaḍā Ḥasan Chāndpūrī. His khalīfah (Shāh Tajammul Ḥusayn Bihārī) mentioned that Shaykh Faḍl al-Raḥmān Ganjmurādābādī held Mawlānā Qāsim Nānotwī and Mawlānā Rashīd Aḥmad Gangohī in high regard, believing them to be from the Awliyā’.[79] The testimony of other non-partisan ‘ulamā’ and Ṣufīs have been collected by Sayyid Nafīs al-Ḥusaynī (1933 – 2008) in his Ḥikāyāt Mehr o Wafā: Buzurgāne Deoband Apne Ham‘aṣr ‘Ulamā’ wa Maskā’ikh Kī Naẓr Mein.

Conclusion

Asrar Rashid paints Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd as a violent zealot who abandoned the Sunnī methodology of his forefathers, came under the tutelage of Wahhābī missionaries, and wrote Taqwiyat al-Īmān under the influence of foreign Wahhābī ideology. As shown above, this entire narrative is false.

Asrar Rashid paints ꜥAllāmah Faḍl al-Ḥaqq Khayrābādī as an upright scholar who supported the 1857 revolution against the British, while this narrative too is deeply flawed. Further, Asrar Rashid puts the blame of “sectarianism” wholly at the hands of Shāh Ismā‘īl Shahīd and those Aḥmad Riḍā Khān Barelwī opposed, completely ignoring the takfīr which fanned the flames of disunity amongst the Sunnīs of the Indian Subcontinent.

Asrar Rashid’s partisanship and sectarian bias towards (mis)readings of history and theology is undeniable. His claims to being objective and unbiased are just that: claims, with no truth to them. It is strange that a lecture on the history of sectarianism would contain so many inaccuracies, and hence peddle a narrative that is more fictitious than factual. What is also evident is the sheer irony of claiming to be objective whilst regurgitating calamitous takfīr-steeped rhetoric, a clear indication that Asrar Rashid is merely repackaging old arguments in a more palatable way.

Objectivity on this issue demands, as a fundamental prerequisite, that unsubstantiated assumptions which lead to unjustified takfīr be clearly rejected. Giving new life to these old arguments is the cause of sectarianism, not its cure, and the obsession with creating distrust of a whole community of subcontinent Sunnī scholarship only serves to fuel divisive, sectarian sentiments that are both unwanted and unnecessary.

If Asrar Rashid has a change of heart and decides to sincerely challenge his false/misleading claims, assumptions and narratives based on the above evidences (much of which have been available online for years), this would be a welcome change, and in the spirit of objectivity, it would be hoped he casts aside the sectarian takfīrī rhetoric and truly embraces the wider Sunnī family.

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Footnotes

[1] “History of Sectarianism: Wahabi, Deobandi, Qadiyani, Khilafat Movement”

[2] Majallah Aḥwāl wa Ᾱthār, no. 20-21. A PDF is available.

[3] Ibid. p. 22

[4] Ibid. p. 98

[5] Ibid. p. 102

[6] Ibid. p. 105

[7] Sīrat Sayyid Aḥmad, 1:353

[8] Majallah Aḥwāl wa Ᾱthār, no. 20-21, p. 22

[9] “The Deobandi-Barelawi Paradigm Shift and Lateral Thinking”

[10] Ibid. p. 105

[11] This is a slip of the tongue. He meant to say “1779”.

[12] This is also a slip of the tongue. He meant to say “1792”.

[13] Islamic Reform and Revival in Nineteenth Century India, Yoda Press, p. 39

[14] Naqsh e Ḥayāt, p. 431-2

[15] Sīrat e Sayyid Aḥmad, 1:342-365

[16] Taqwiyat al-Īmān, Qasid Kitab Ghar, p. 82

[17] A PDF of which is available

[18] ‘Abaqāt, p. 174:


[19] Yak Rozah, p. 2

[20] ‘Abaqāt, p. 3

[21] Ibid.

[22] Al-Ḥiṭṭah fi l-Ṣiḥāḥ al-Sittah, Dār al-Jīl, p. 258

[23] See: www.deoband.org/2010/09/aqida/allah-and-his-attributes/the-reality-of-shirk-its-manifestations-and-its-types/

[24] It is based on a misreading of a passage from Īḍāḥ al-Ḥaqq al-Ṣarīḥ

[25] ‘Abaqāt, p. 35, 102

[26] Mathnawī Silk e Nūr; quoted in Shāh Ismā‘īl Muḥaddith al-Dehlawī , p. 132

[27] Naqsh e Ḥayāt, p. 432

[28] See: Naqd al-Ru’yat al-Wahhābiyyah li l-Tawḥīd by ‘Uthmān Nābulūsī

[29] Radd al-Ishrāk, p. 15-6:


[30] هذه المقدمة لا غبار عليها، والفرق شاسع جدًأ بين كلامه وكلام محمد بن عبد الوهاب

[31] www.deoband.org/2010/09/aqida/allah-and-his-attributes/the-reality-of-shirk-its-manifestations-and-its-types/

[32] Taqwiyat al-Īmān, p. 8

[33] Majallah Aḥwāl wa Ᾱthār, no. 20-21, p. 88

[34] Al-Ta’līfāt al-Rashīdiyya p.86-8

[35] www.deoband.org/2013/01/aqida/allah-and-his-attributes/the-peak-of-comprehension-on-the-categories-of-polytheism/

[36] Majallah Aḥwāl wa Ᾱthār, no. 20-21, p. 75-9

[37] Ta’līfāt Rashidiyya, p. 90

[38] Imdad al-Fatāwā, Zakariyyā Book Depo, 11:574

[39] Fayḍ al-Bārī, 1:252

[40] Ibid.

[41] Imdad al-Fatāwā, Zakariyyā Book Depo, 11:574

[42] Life Sketch of Syed Ahmed Shahid, p. 23-5

[43] Taqwiyat al-Īmān, p. 44

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Yak Rozah, p. 2-3

[47] Yak Rozah, p. 4-5

[48] Ibid. p. 10-2

[49] Majallah Aḥwāl wa Ᾱthār, no. 20-21, p. 35; Mawlānā Nūr al-Ḥasan shows this support is authentic from him

[50] Abjad al-‘Ulūm, 3:254

[51] Majallah Aḥwāl wa Ᾱthār, no. 20-21, p. 153

[52] Abjad al-‘Ulūm, 3:248

[53] Fatāwā Mehria, p. 11

[54] Majallah Aḥwāl wa Ᾱthār, no. 20-21, p. 152-3

[55] Abjad al-‘Ulūm, 3:254

[56] Nuzhat al-Khawāṭir, 1063-5

[57] Ibid,

[58] Letters, prison sketches and autobiographical literature; The Indian Economic & Social History Review 03 2006 ; vol. 43, 1 : pp. 77-100. A PDF of this article is available at request.

[59] Ibid. p. 87

[60] P. 88

[61] P. 90

[62] P. 96

[63] See Dr Khalid Maḥmūd’s introduction to Taḥdhīr al-Nās, p.7-29. See also: ahlussunnah.boards.net/thread/1031/asrar-rashid-mawlana-nanotwi-nubuwwah

[64] For details, see Taḥdhīr al-Nās Eik Taḥqīqī Mutāla‘ah, p. 11-20; unjustified takfir was made earlier on a related issue which was refuted by Sayyid Ḥaydar ‘Alī Tonkī (1788 – 1856) in al-Kalām al-Fāḍil al-Kabīr ‘alā Ahl al-Takfīr.

[65] Taḥdhīr al-Nās, p. 56

[66] Tahdhīr un-Nās Merī Nazar Meh, p. 58

[67] Dhol kī Ᾱwāz; quoted in Ḥikāyāt Mehr o Wafā, p. 40

[68] Taḥdhīr al-Nās Eik Taḥqīqī Mutāla‘ah, p. 27

[69] See: The Decisive Debate, p.86-7; available as a PDF online. See also: ahlussunnah.boards.net/thread/1031/asrar-rashid-mawlana-nanotwi-nubuwwah

[70] For detailed refutations, see the works of Mawlānā Murtaḍā Ḥasan Chāndpūrī, al-Shihāb al-Thāqib of Mawlānā Ḥusayn Aḥmad Madani and Fayṣlah Kun Munāẓarah by Mawlānā Manẓūr Nu‘māni. The latter has been translated as “The Decisive Debate” and is available as a PDF online.

[71] al-Shihāb al-Thāqib, p. 249, 259

[72] Ta’līfāt Rashīdiyyah, p. 96; al-Shihāb al-Thāqib, p. 260

[73] Majmū‘ah Rasā’il Chāndpūrī, 1:106

[74] Barāhīn Qāṭi‘ah, p. 55-6

[75] Al-Muhannad ‘ala l-Mufannad, Dār al-Fatḥ, p. 71-3

[76] Ḥifẓ al-Īmān, p. 14-5

[77] Basṭ al-Banān; quoted in Fayṣlah Kun Munāẓarah, p.171-2

[78] Ḥusām al-Ḥaramayn, p. 64

[79] Kamālāt Raḥmānī; quoted in Ḥikāyāt Mehr o Wafā, p. 5

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References

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↑1 قل من بيده ملكوت كل شيء وهو يجير ولا يجار عليه إن كنتم تعلمون، سيقولون: الله، فل: فأنى تسحرون؟

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Taken from HERE